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The Relevance of Japanese finance and its Main Bank System 
Hugh I. Patrick 
What lessons can be learned from the Japanese experience with its main bank system 
and, more broadly, its financial system? Mow relevant is that experience for the 
developing market economies? For the transforming socialist economies? These are 
the central themes of this chapter, which explores a range? of key generic: issues 
in the design of good financial systems for developing market and transforming 
socialist economies in light of Japanese experience. Consonant with the 
objectives of this book, a major focus is on the main bank system in its heyday, 
namely the rapid growth era from the early 1950s to the early 1970s; and on 
placing the main bank system within the overall architecture? of the Japanese 
financial system, its structure and the government's financial policies. VI 
A comparative analysis from the perspective of the banking systems of other 
countries is provided by this Part of the book, the next chapter, in providing an 
analysis of the relationships among large German banks and large industrial 
corporations, makes clear that while Japanese and German banking are broadly 
similar1 (hence the? "Japanese German model" of banking-based finance?), they differ 
significantly in certain details, especially in regards to corporate governance?. 
the remaining five chapters illuminate the issues of finance? and banking from the 
perspectives and in light of the experiences of three major developing market 
economies Korea, India, and Mexico and two transforming socialist economies 
.1. this essay is based upon the? chapters in this book and upon a wider body of 
research on the Japanese financial system. I am especially "indebted to the other authors 
and participants in the project workshops for their substantive? comments. I particularly 
acknowledge the writings over the years of Juro Teranishi; the recently completed project 
on the financial development of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Patrick and Park, 1994); and the 
World Hank World Development Report (1989) and its various more? recent Working Papers. 
Nonetheless, this essay is my assessment and evaluation, and no others are responsible? for 
the judgments presented here. 
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China and Poland. I'hosc country studies utilize? and build upon Lho Lhorough, 
detailed sLudies of Lho Japanese? m a m bank sysLem in Part I. 
"lho next section of Lhis chcjpLor addresses general analytic concerns. I he 
basic objectives of any nation's financial system are to provide a stable, 
reliable, safe means of payment; to encourage? and facilitate real saving; Lo 
mobilize those savings \n financial form; and to allocate fhom efficiently and 
effectively to finance Lho most produei.ivo investment projects. A hierarchy of 
issues must be considered in Lho creation of a good financial system. I'hey can be 
classified at three levels of analysis, while? recognizing that inferacLions among 
issues are pervasive and important. At the most fundamental, systemic 'level <\rc 
issues about the basic nature? of the economy and of macroeconomic policy. AL an 
intermediaLo level arc? issues concerning Lho archiLecture of Lho financial system 
and financial policies. At the micro level are issues concerning the riaLure of 
the banking system and the effective? operation of banks. Now Japan has dea 11; wiLh 
these, and \n particular how the main bank system fit it. accordingly are 
discussed in the foil owing three? sections. The relevance, lessons, and 
transferability of the Japanese financial system, in particular the main bank 
system, to developing market and transforming socialist economies are? addressed in 
the final sections of the chapter. 
I AnalyticaI Issues 
The approach in Lhis chapter is to consider key generic elements in Lho 
creation of a good financial system anei how Japanese policymakers, financiers, and 
markets have dealt wiLh them, rather Lhan arguing that the Japanese financial 
system, especially its main bank system, should (much less could) simply be? 
replicated \n other countries, fach developing market economy or transforming 
socialist economy (LSI-) has its own specific circumstances, experiences. 
institutions and history. Given national differences, there? is no single? opLimal 
financial system mode?! for all countries at all levels of development. 
Unlike? Part I, where most of the discussion focuses on the Japanese main 
bank system in the context of the Japanese? financial system and its evolution, the 
approach here is to appraise the Japanese? experience in Tight of the basic 
structural, institutional, and policy problems of finance? that most developing 
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market and TSI's curronLly face. To a greater or lesser degree the problems have? 
boon inflation and macroeconomic instabi I icy; weak legal, economic and financial 
infrastructure; inadequate economic and financial informal; ion and ii;s asymmeLric 
distribution among economic actors; weak banking systems and capital markets; 
short supply of human resources wiLh iiriance skills including credit analysis; 
financial repress ion; soft budgeting; and corrupt ion. 
I inancial systems, like economies, evolve over time in response? i;o changing 
economic eiircums Lances and o[)porf un it ics as well as socio-political condi Lions and 
objectives. I he broad contours of Lhe long run historical paLLern of financial 
evolution is common across countries. AL the earliest stage of development saving 
is done by invesLors; finance is internal. Indeed, infernal finance? continues Lo 
be the dominant source of industrial finance even \n the most advanced economies. 
However, its overwhelming role is attenuated over time as savers and investors 
increasingly become different ontiLies and as entrepreneurs and firms develop new 
profitable invesLment projects larger Lhan can be financed internally. 
In all economies banks have been and continue to be the dominant external 
source o'\: business finance, certainly for Lhe entire sector of smaller enterprises 
and even for many large companies. At some point and timing differs 
significantly among countries and financial instruments large companies obtain 
financing through the issuance of equiLy, bonds, and commercial paper in capital 
markets. Whether first to create insLiLutions and pursue policies favoring bank 
loan finance? or securities market finance?, or to do both simultaneously, is a key 
issue in designing financial systems. If priority is given to banking, as has 
been the historical experience of financial development for many countries, when 
and how is such preferential treatmenL brought to an end? We have two historical 
models. In the Anglo American experience. securiLies markets developed early. 
Postwar Japan and Germany are major examples of the banking based model; 
securities markeLs have developed only recently. 
Wise policymakers consider a range of alternative systems and instiLuf lona I 
arrangements, and learn from the successes and failures in the actual experiences 
of other countries as well as from theory. lo narrow one's scope? and perspective 
can lead to making wrong policy choices. Thus, there is always the danger of 
giving excessive weight to the comparaLive experience one? knows best. To what 
extent are Last I uropean economies heavily influenced by continental Western 
l-uropean models, or by advisers intellectually grounded \n the Anglo-American 
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model7 Arc Korea, laiwan, China, or Southeast Asian nations seeking guidance? 
predominantly from Lho Japarese experience? 
1.1 What Periods of Japanese I inaneial Dove? lopmenf are Pelevanl, and for Whom? 
Is the Japanese economic: and financial development experience so 
distinctive? as to be considered unique?? I he answer is coruiirily no. I he? 
differences in the Japanese C inaneial system are ones of dc?grce, no I; of' kind. 
Japanese policymakers have had Lo deal with the? same? major issues in developing 
the architecture and operations of its financial system as have? policymakers in 
a I I market economies . 
the different stages of Japan's evoluLionary financial development offer 
different insights lessons and hence are? differentially relevant for 
countries at various stages of market development. (See particularly the chapters 
by leranishi and Aoki.) Japanese pel ic:ymakers and financiers in the? late 
nineteenth century established a mode?rn financial system by adopting and adapting 
Western models and institutions. Initially entry was very easy, with low minimum 
capital requirements and virtually no prudential regulation or protection of 
deposits; by the first decade of the fwentie?th century some? /'JOG banks were \n 
operation, mostly small, local, unit banks established by industrialists seeking 
to finance their enterprises. lhe successful growth of the banking system was 
marre?d by occasional bank runs and financial panic?;, culminating in the? dramatic 
banking crisis of \{)?/. Groaier government regulation, higher minimum capital 
requirements, consolidation, and the increasing si/e and market share? of a few 
large banks resulted. 
World War 11 brought further regulation, consolidation, and control. Ihaf 
experience, especially coupled with the immediate postwar e?xperie?nce of 
dislocation, high inflation, conversion from munitions l;o civilian goods 
production, huge overhang of bad debts for both companies and banks, and efforts 
to create? a democratic: society, is particularly relevant for the currently 
transforming Puropoan socialist economies. Insights. eve?n lessons, can be? derived 
from how Japanese policymakers dealt with the same? sorts of problems as those? 
currently facing the ISPs. (See the chapter on Poland by lloshi et a I.) 
Nonetheless there are important differences as well. Perhaps most important is 
that postwar Japan had several generations of prewar experie?nce in a l:rcc rnarkc?!;. 
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private enterprise system in which finano i a I 'institutions became well developed 
and considerable human resource skills were built up. Moreover. Japan was under 
Allied occupation and institutional and other change could be more readily 
imposed, subject ot course to the? willingness ot the? Japanese to accept and 
maintain those changes, especially once? independence was restored \n \9b7. 
the subsequent high growth era was the heyday of banking and of the main 
bank system, it was the period ot exceptionally rapid real (M) growth, averaging 
close to \i)% annually, as private business investment and private saving increased 
dramatically absolutely and as a share of CiNI}. Corporations needed ever 
increasing amounts and proportions of external finance, and banks provided the 
great bulk ot it. It was an era ot modest financial repression in which real 
interest rates were positive but low. and of relatively limited programs ot 
directed credit for government defined key activities and sectors. In many 
respects the main banks came to epitomize, or symbol i/e, Japan's economic system 
\r\ the high growth era. And it is this era that probably is most immediately 
relevant for developing market economies and, as their transitions proceed, for 
I SI s as we I I . 
Uy the late stages of the high growth era the early 1970s both the 
real economy and the financial system had grown, evolved, deepened ~u\ structure. 
and became institutionally stronger. The balance of payments constraint on growth 
had been lifted. Inflationary pressures had been successfully contained for more 
than two decades. /Japan's export capacity had increased rapidly and the yen, 
initially overvalued, had become undervalued, loan interest rates had been 
positive throughout, financial markets had come to work increasingly we'll, and the 
proportion of directed credit for developmental purposes, never high In aggregate, 
had declined substantially. I inanciai institutions and their1 management 
capabilities and the associated accounting, audit inc.], and reporting 
'infrastructure had become quite well developed. I he system was more than ready 
tor further financial reform: deregulation, 1 iborali/afion, a widening range ot 
financial instruments and markets, the final termination ot foreign exchange 
controls over capital outflows and inflows in other words, the transition (some 
would say overdue) to a competitive financial system (World Hank, 1989, p. 1/7). 
This took place gradually and piecemeal from the mid 1.9/0s, and in some respects 
is yet to be completed. 
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Japan's subsequent experience as an advanced indusfr ia I (economy in i;hc 
sustained good growth era trorn Lhe mid 1970s i,o the early 1990s is also ot 
cons iderab le relevance. Iconomic growth slowed, though Lo rates still above Lho 
01 CI) average. lor Lho first time ox ante? private saving exceeded ex anLe private 
investment and the financial sy.sl.orn war. flush with funds. In the second half of 
the 19/Os Lho government resorted to fiscal stimulus through budget deficits and 
large government bonds issue, Lhereby bringing abouL Lhe development of a 
secondary bond market. In the 1980s Ja[)an developed a huge current accounL 
surplus, thanks in pari, to the overvalued dollar. lho government during this 
period implemented] a gradual, piecemeal program of financial deregulation. 
financial repression ended and greaLer oompcLiLion ensued in mosL financial 
markets, with new stresses on and opporLuniLies for individual financial 
institutions. Securities markeLs burgeoned as many large listed firms found bond 
and equity issue a less expensive? source? of external funds than bank loans. While 
the domestic corporate bond issue market remained relatively underdeveloped and 
restricted, l-uro market bond issues thrived. During this period the main bank 
system evolved and became embedded in market based finance. 
these trends were seriously exacerbated by Lho asset bubble the groat 
boom in the stock and land market prices between 1985 and 1990. In retrospect 
this was a period of system wide failure, 'lhe speculative? mania was fed by Lho 
mistaken but widespread belief, shared even by conservative banks and government 
regulators, that asset prices would noL decline seriously or for any susLained 
period of time. During 198!) 90 banks and oLher financial institutions lent on 
ever easier terms for purchase of ever higher-priced land and for real estate 
development projects. Lhe bursting of the bubble from 1990 has left in its wake 
the difficult problems of a serious bad debt overhang for the entire banking 
system. Lhe first since Lhe late 1940s. 
Japan's long historical experience as a successful developing market 
economy clearly is directly relevant for other developing market economies which, 
after all, have gone through their own banking and financial market development. 
Lho ISI's however, have to create the full panoply of private ownership, capitalist 
market institutions, incentives, and behavior virtually from the ground up. While 
they face tremendous difficulties and obstacles in virtually creating a new 
financial system rather than modifying an existing one, the ISts can learn much 
from the Japanese model and experience both \n determining their basic financial 
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arch itecture and policies and in dealing wi Lh Lheir esf)ec. ia M y important immediate 
problems of inflation, overhang of t)ad debts and bank insolvency, soft budgeting, 
and lack of human resources. 
At the same? time, several cautionary notes about the Japanese experience 
should be sounded tor those seeking lessons. I ifst, the fact that a particular 
set of policies and institutional arrangements worked well \n Japan does not mean 
they were? optimal. Second, Japan's, extraordinarily successful economic 
performance does not mean that everything was done right. Ihird, the Japanese 
model cannot simply be applied directly or simply; it must be adapted to each 
country's own requirements, lourth, what counts is substance, not form; mere 
adoption of institutions or policies without appropriate incentives and regulatory 
arrangements will not succeed. 
1.7 I undamenfa I Characteristics of the Japanese M a m hank System 
I ho nature, operations, effectiveness, and evolution of the Japanese main 
bank system are described and analyzed in rich, nuancod detail in Chapter I and 
the other chapters of Part !. However, if is useful to repeat here its key 
features, albeit in styli/od form, as an introduction to and reference point for 
what follows. The discussion focusses on the high growth era of the early l%0s 
to the early 19/0s. The main bank system is based on the special relationships 
that developed between Japanese large banks (predominantly the? twenty--odd city 
banks, trust banks, and long ••term credit banks) and large industrial corporations, 
notably the 1000 or so then listed on the stock exchanges. While the main bank 
system is conceptually different from the six financial keiretsu business groups 
(Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Dai ichi, luyo, and Sanwa), in practice most of the 
main bank relationships are with their banks or with the industrial Hank of Japan, 
the largest of the three private long- term credit banks. 
Relationships between bank and borrower are a general characteristic of 
banking \n all countries, since repeated transactions and accumulated knowledge of 
borrower creditworthiness are always important, the /Japanese main bank system is 
a highly developed, more? intensive, closer and \n certain other respects 
distinctive form; it can be regarded as the epitome of relationship banking. I he 
system was not a deliberate creation of special government policy; if was an 
institution which developed and evolved as an effective response to the costs of 
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moniloring in an environment of highly imperfect i'n formal ion and to the overa I I 
institutional framework and sol of govcrnmcnl financial policies. 
lho m a m bank corporate client relationship is rnu IL id imons iona I. In 
sLereotypc the main bank typically is fho largest single lender to its corporate 
client CM) ?Wl of loans) and its largest shareholder among banks (close Lo fhon 
\\)l coiling). further, i I, is Lho main clearing brink tor p<iyrncTi f self lemonL 
dccounfs, Lr'usLee for collateral for any bonds issued, major beneficiary of 
foreign exchange and other fee based business, and provider of (financial) 
management humeri resources. 11 is Lhe major morn lor of the client firm's 
management and performance. It Lakes the lead in arranging do facto lending 
syndicales wiLh other banks and financial institutions tor 1 Is clients. 
Importantly, iL Lakes special responsibility for rescuing and resLructuring a 
client firm in distress, Laking on cosLs greater Lhan ils formal exposure; this is 
the rnosL distinctive feature of main bank functions. Unless Lhe siLuafion appears 
to be virtually hopeless, the presumplion of the main bank, of the client, and 
of the business, financial, and public policy communities is that the main bank 
will rescue the firm through restructuring or merger rather than liquidating it. 
These relationships, arrangements, and commitments are based not on legal 
eonlracls but on a history of understandings and expectations, the? build-up of 
(invoslmenl in) trust, and repulaliona I effects. 
The essence of the main bank system has lain in ils slrong information 
collecting, related monitoring capabilities, and managemcnl consulting, lo LhaL 
end banks have established systems and built up human resources, both in their 
personnel sysLem of permanent employment, on-the-job training, and rotation in 
assignments, and in the devolopmenl of special Loams dedicated to manage the 
rolalionship with each major corporate client. Monitoring is of course cosily, 
but the main bank did not directly charge to cover the costs. Neither did il 
receive higher interest rates. falher, if has been compensated by preferential 
access Lo the client's transactions deposits and Lo Lhe deposits of its employees, 
subsidiaries and subcontractors, and preferential provision of foe services and 
Lhe handling of foreign exchange transactions in less price compeliLive markets. 
from Lhe perspective of the borrowing firm. Lhe main bank has been a secure 
source? of loans when credit was fight, as it was most of the Lime during Lhe high 
growth era even for large firms; a source of financial information and expertise; 
and a friend in times of distress. The firm was prepared to provide its main bank 
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cons idorab l.y more? \r\ formaL ion aboui, i Ls oricjo i ncj and proposed activiLios and plans, 
and subject iLself to ongoing moniLoring, Lhan iL was to oLher potential monitor's. 
AL the sdirie time it ma mfa iined good rolaLions wiLh several oLhor compeLiLor c i L.y 
banks (is a hedge againsL opporfun isi, io behavior by i Ls main bank. It held a 
modest proportion up to \% or so of Lhe equ iL.y of i Ls main bank; sLable 
cross-shareholding solidified the? relationship and turned out to be a good long 
run financial investmonL, dospiLo very low dividend rates, as share prices have 
appreciated substantially despiLe Lhe decline since 1990. In the high growth era 
large Firms grew extraordinarily rapidly, 10 \Wl a year on average, they 
increased their* direct investmonL even more rapidly, \<\v beyond Lhe.ir capaciLy Lo 
finance infernal l.y despiLe very low dividend payout raLios. Ihey invested a loL, 
saved a lot, borrowed a loL, and increased financial assets (compensating de[)osiL 
balances, Lrade credit, cross-shareholding) a lot. 
the stylized facLs, as wol I as Lheory, suggosi, Lhe? main bank system was 
quite efficient \n two major respects. I irst, through investmonL in monitoring, 
main banks were? able to increase information and improve credit evaluation, 
thereby reducing loan risk premia; and they probably improved corporate management 
performance by providing incentives not Lo shirk, the main bank system 
accordingly reduced the agency cosLs of external finance, overcame problems of 
imperfect information and its asymmetric distribution, and made if possible? for 
firms to overcome the liquidity constraints of reliance? on internal 'financing. 
the system enabled banks Lo diversify portfolios by being main banks for some? 
large corporations and participants in a syndicate? of lenders Lo oLhors. 
Second, the? system reduced the? costs of reorganizing and restructuring 
firms in distress; there is considerable case sLudy evidence of Lhis. Rescued 
firms were able Lo produce, sell, and invest more? Lhan similarly distressed firms 
without a close? main bank relationship. Japanese costs of restructuring large 
firms were significantly lower than for distressed American firms using the 
bankruptcy procedures of the? United SLates. Japanese bankruptcy laws are? credible 
and relatively strong, including removal of fop management; Lhe possibiliLy of 
bankruptcy certainly acLod as a deterrenL. encouraging quick settlement on terms 
negotiated with the main bank. In the high growth era there? were only a few 
clear c u t instances of firms thai, should have? been I iqu idaLod buL were bailed out 
referred to as soft budgeting problems or typo 7 errors. 
93 09 03 III* Relevance 10 
There is much less evidence on Lhe effect ivemesss of (iriLerim) monitoring of 
firms \n Lhe ordinary course of business. Some? pracl; i L ioners indicate? iL was 
quite effective; others say iL was f requent l.y [)ro forma and routine. i ncreas iruj I y 
so (is Lime passed, relaLionships were c?si,abl ished, and firms prospered. Yet Lhere 
have been a number of eases of quiet restructurings \n less exLrome situations. on 
Lerms not made.} public. I'he posL hubb I c? era of serious bad loan problems is 
imposing high costs on many banks; Lhe specula Live myopia of Lhe? laLo 1980s 
overwhelmed what previously had been effective main bank moniLorinq sysLcms. 
The Japanese main bank system is not a panacea, if has weaknesses as well 
as strengths. lhe main bank relationship is privaLe rind participants, not 
surprisingly, are secretive about Lhe specifies. The regulatory authorities have 
used administrative guidance? and informal communication with banks; Lhe degree? of 
public disclosure has been limited. lhe co/y reiationships between regulators and 
banks were based on preferential access Lo information and mutual trust, not Lo be 
shared with outsiders. The entire financial system is appropriately characteri/ed 
as opaque. Thus, there? are 'few careful, detailed empirical studies of the costs 
and benefits of the m a m bank system. 
A serious problem has boon the potential collusive exercise of 
oligopolistic market power by the large banks, both as main banks and more? 
generally as financiers of big business. The evidence is mixed, but iL appears 
there? was a substantial degree? of competition among Lhe do/en or so city banks. 
Relationship banking provides insider access to information for lenders; Lhe? main 
bank system increased that degree of access and hence the possibilities of 
exploitation for institutional or personal benefit. Corrupt behavior in lending 
or other decisions by bankers or the regulating officials has been the exception. 
Despite some? notable?, indeed flamboyantly scandalous exceptions, there is "little 
evidence that this was a serious problem overall. The system was basically 
honest. 
Systemic Issues and Macroeconomic Performance 
the most fundamental question is what kind of economic system a country 
wants, the assumption here is that policymakers in developing market and 
transforming socialist economies, like Japanese, are committed to a predominantly 
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private enterprise, froc? and compel; it i vo market economic, system for' goods, 
services, labor, Id rid, rind capital, including finance. Yet many economies are 
reluctant Lo give u[) state ownership, particularly of "strategic" sectors however 
defined but often including Iho banking system (see Lhe chapters on India and 
China). I his is a key issue for I Sis, but has been important in many developing 
market economies as weli (sec? the ohapLers on Keren and Mexico). 
What is a country's development strategy: export or ion Led versus imporL 
subs L i Luting? What arc? the respective roles of domestic saving and foreign 
borrowing? What is the nature and degree of industrial policy, however defined? 
An open economy Lhe free international flow of goods, services, and capital 
may be an ultimate? objective buL iL is Lypically far from currenL reality. Mow 
quickly should an economy be opened, and in what sequence? An autarchic Japan 
benefited from being forcibly opened Lo I'rcr, Lrade in tfti>9. IL also probably 
benefited from import protection and capital outflow restrictions in the early 
phases of the postwar high growth era of rapid domestic: market expansion and 
government ••encouraged strong competition among Japanese firms, many of them new 
entrants. 
two 'further policy issues are of systemic importance, first, macroeconomic: 
stability especially reasonable: price stability is essential for Lhe 
effective and efficient functioning of a financial system and, while the evidence 
is mixed, for overall economic: performance as well. Second, the establishment of 
institutions to support the market economy particularly the legal system and 
information systems of accounting, auditing, disclosure, and transparency is 
essential. Who monitors companies, banks, and other economic players, how. and 
how well? A central theme? of this book is that the main bank system of monitoring 
well met the needs for information prior to the establishment of adequate 
information systems. If forts to achieve macroeconomic stability, build the 
institutional support structure, and create financial institutions are likely to 
be going on simultaneously, particularly in I SIs. they are all requisites for a 
good financial system. 
Japan's Iconomy and finance? in the High Growth Ira 
Japanese economic growth in the two decades beginning in the early 1%0s 
was extraordinary, averaging close? to 10X annually. Hut if was not a miracle; if 
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can be rather we? I I understood and exp la inod in i.erms of sfandard economic facfors, 
supportive government policies, and an improving and expand i rig infernaUoria I 
onvi ronmeni,. Confrol over1 inflation., price? stain I i f.y. and <\ fixed exchange rai,e 
were fully accepted (.is the? macroeconomic re(|u is i Lcs for successful economic arid 
financial growth. In fhe early to mid 1%()s Japan succeeded in overcoming i;he 
overwhelming economic problems of the early postwar period: high inflation, shift 
i;o civilian goods production, war-damage boLLlenoeks, reconstruction. Moreover, 
if established or solidified its political, social, and economic institutional 
structure. These especially macroeconomic suability were fhe foundations 
for the sustained spurt of rapid growfh, which no one anticipated and in fhe early 
years did not believe? could be sustained. {]w/on Japan's, negligible natural 
resource? base, growth was founded on rapid industrialization, and fhe development 
of manufaoLuring firms in virtually every (civilian goods) mdusfry as fhe 
industrial structure deepened. (Standard analyses \n l.nglish of Japan's economy 
and economic performance in fhe high growfh era include I'africk and kosovsky 
(1.9/6). Nakamura (1981). Kosai (1986), and Yamamura and Yasuba (198/).) 
As surpris'ing as it seems today, Japan in the mid 19h()s was classified as a 
less developed country because of its low income? per capita; it graduated to 
developed country status only in 1964. However Japan differed from other low 
income? countries in that it had a labor force? at least equivalent in education to 
Western furope's, a sustained prewar experience of successful economic 
development, and substantial numbers of managers, engineers, and technicians 
capable of absorbing foreign technoiogy. Its technological gap behind best known 
practices was substantial. Sustained very rapid growfh was achieved by firms 
offeetiveiy utilizing the? increasingly educated anei ski lied labor force, importing 
huge amounts of foreign technoiogy. and engaging in unprecedentedly rapid plant 
and oguipmont investment in new, more? productive? capacity. 
Two related issues in interpreting Japanese experience remain controversial 
even among specialists: whether growth was state led or led by private 
enterprise; and whether industrial policy was successful or not. My judgment is 
thai while? the sfate played a significantly constructive role?, the engine of 
Japan's successful industrialization was private business entrepreneurship anei 
investment; without this, government support and intervention would have? been 
ineffective, if not counterproductive, fhe results of industrial policy were 
mixed: some industries were prornoLed and became? globally competitive, others did 
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not; the success or many winner1 indusLries was due? pr imar i l.y Lo business 
leadership and the evolution oi r.omparaLive advanLage from labor intensive 
products such as textiles i.o medium skill, rucMJ i urn Lech indusLries such as 
aufomob ities and consumer el ocLron ics not Lo a di (Terorit ia I ly su[)[)orl; i ve 
indusLrial policy, lor genera I discussions 01 indu.sLric.il [)olic.y see Johnson 
(198^), Patrick (1.986), Dore (I98()), Komiya et a I (1988), and OkimoLo (1989): for 
indusLry specific sLudies see Sdmueis (198/), I riedman (198)8)), Anchordoguy (1989), 
(ind GcnLher (1990). 
Certainly Lhe governmorii, role was important. IL pursued an i rives Lmenf 
encouraging macroeconomic [)olicy mix oi restrictive fiscal po I Icy and expansive 
monetary policy. The government, budgoi, was essentially balanced; Lhere was 
virtually no new net government debt issue until Lhe mid 19/0s. InflaLion had 
wiped ouL Lhe wartime governmenL debt. and during Lhe high growth era govorrimcriL 
debt as a share of GNP was low. One by produeL was Lhore was no secondary marked, 
in Treasury bilIs or longer Lerm government debt. 
Lhe government provided a supporLivo environment for private business 
indusfr la I eriLreproneursh ip, inc lud ing Lhe necessary physical \n LrasLructure 
(utilities, transportation, communicaLions). I hero were no sLate enterprises in 
manufacturing aside from cigareLLes and other Lobaceo products, a monopoly Cor 
revenue purposes, importantly, following postwar reconstruction the government 
gave highest, indeed almost sole, prioriLy Lo economic growLh as Lhe soluLiori to 
almost all problems. If did noL compeLe wiLh private business Lor resources, the 
government sector was small, and social eosLs of rapid industri"a I ii/al; ion (air and 
water pollution, urban congest'ion, lagging improvements in housing) were allowed 
to accumulate until the early 19/0s. lhe developmenL sLrafogy was Lo encourage 
broad based industrialization in compofiLive domestic markets. if encouraged new 
domestic entry but continued the? early postwar protection of industry against 
import competition or direct invesLmenL in Japan by foreign muIfinaLionals. 
"I xport and Save" was Lhe slogan on a huge banner across the entrance Lo 
the liank of Japan in the 1%()s and ' (>()s. I'ven so. like Lhe United SLatos buL 
unlike mosi: rapidly growing economies, Ja[)anese postwar economic growth has been 
predominanLly driven by domestic markoL demand.. I xporfs have never been more? than 
10 lb% of GNP. This reflected Lhe size of the potential domestic market in a 
country whose population was twice that of any Western Luropoan country. A I; Lhe 
same time, in Lhe high growth era import!, of machinery, equipment, and raw 
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materials wore esscnf ia I and Lho t)<j I <j ric:c? of payments became the operative 
constraint. in that respect exports were vital to pay Cor essentia I imports, 
rather than representing an export led growth strategy. I'ri Lhc: world cap i La I 
market conditions of the 'I9!i()s and 'fcOs Jaj)an was not able? Co finance a current 
account deficit by heavy foreign borrowing, unlike Korea and oi.her countries in 
the 19/()s. 
One of the most noteworthy features of Japan's successful growth 
performance was the tremendous increase in household saving as a share of family 
income and of GNI\ peaking in 19/3 before declining gradually since Chen. 
Nonetheless, while burgeoning investment demand was almost always straining 
against domestic saving constraints, this showed up from time to time as a current 
account deficit rather than high inflation. I he fixed exchange rate taken by 
policymakers as a given until 19/1 and the persisting allergy against inflation 
engendered by the early postwar traumas made macroeconomic control of inflation 
essential. 
Rapid economic growth was and is a virtuous circle?. If justified, by 
making profitable, the rapid expansion of productive capacity by firms and 
generated demand for new projects and products, it increased the value of new 
projects and investment in them. If meant that even marginal projects were not 
outright failures; the instances of 'large firm bankruptcy or restructuring were 
relatively few and the costs limited. Many new small firms wore continuously 
being created and many of them failed, most sooner rather Chan later; both entry 
and exit rates for small firms in Japan have been high relative? to the United 
States and other industrial countries. Rapid growth generated high saving rates 
by households and corporations, (t generated rapid increases \n real wages, and 
consumption, thereby providing a social rationale for low interest rates on saving 
deposits. However, the slowdown in growth rates since 19/3 has had the opposite 
effects. Over time firms prospered, grew more powerful and competitive, and 
became increasingly independent of government influence. Japan's export success, 
commensurate with its domestic growth, made it possible? to reduce? import barriers. 
and over time that has taken place albeit primarily in manufactures and to a 
significant degree in response to foreign pressures. 
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7 Some? ImporLanL I rise ifuf lona I I eaLures 
Japan like other countries has a private onLorpriso; privates ownership, 
market economy; like them. \l also has i Ls own spc?c: I f i c features oC capita I'ism. I 
briefly consider several as of particular relevance for undorsLanding Lhe Ja[)anese 
financial system. I hose include reliance on business relationships; various Lypes 
of business groups (to which the Lerm koiroLsu is Lypieally loosely applied); dnd 
the high quality of the central government bureaucracy, especially those 
encourag i ng, supervi si ng, and regu I a L i rig Lhe i' i nanci a I sys I; em. 
One important feaLuro of Lhe Japanese economy is Lhaf many markets are noL 
impersonal, arms length, spoL markets. Ihey are moderaLod by re IaLionships among 
market participants founded upon the t)uil(ling and ma infonanco of trust through 
repeated transacLions and honorable? (non opportunistic) handling of unant ic i pa Led 
situations. In Lhe Ja[)anese ideal, institutional relationships are expocLod Lo 
continue for a very long Lime for practical purposes Lhe game? is usually 
assumed to go on forever. Relationships are multidimensional, complex, and subtly 
nuancod. Although built upon personal i si; ic: relationships, Lhcy transcend their 
implementation by specific individuals representing the partners. 
Relationships are reflected in labor markets, subcontracting, buyers and 
suppliers, brand loyalty, and in banking, epitomized in the main bank system, as 
well as other financial service!,. Such relationships are characteristic of 
business \n all economies, so the matter is one? of degree not of kind. 1.1; is 
commonly assumed, though solid empirical evidence is limited, that business based 
on relationship arrangements and networks is more extensive and intensive in Japan 
than in the United States. 
A system ol' economic transacLions in which relationships are important has 
both efficiencies and inefficiencies. Japanese seem to have maximized those 
efficiencies while? limiting the inefficiencies. Relationships enhance the degree 
and reduce Lhe cost of access to information and monitoring. Relationships 
require) an investment of resources into what became? relationship-specific sunk 
costs, ihey are created over time since they have? to be built upon Lrust 
engendered by repeated experience; trust is conditional upon the behavior and 
performance of the partners. The payoff is that relationships increase the return 
on relationship specii'ic investments (such as subcontractors designing an auto 
part Lor a particular model, or a main bank loan) by enhancing confidence that Lhe 
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partner will not behave opporfun iisl. ica I ly . Re I ai; ionsh ips overcome some? of Lhe 
inefi 'ic lene ies in a spol market arising from imperfeoL, asymmetric information 
such as under investment in specific assefs due to failure Lo safeguard agamsL 
opportunism, or1 overinvestment due Lo multiple soureing or dup I i cation of 
monitoring effects. If is also argued that supplier buyer relationship systems 
overcome bureaucratic diseconomies wii.hin vertically inLcgrated firms. 
Re laL mnshi ps provide an effecLivc mechanism for dealing wifh uncerLa inLy, 
unanLieipatcd changes of circumstances (sLaLes of nature), since it is impossible 
to wriLe, much less implemeriL. a perfectly complete contracL. 
Relationship systems can also result in serious ineCficiericies and social 
cost!). fhey are ossenLially exclusive insider sysLems: enLry by outsiders is 
difficult. fhey <}rc. murky and opaque, not Lrarisparont; Lhey creaLe opporLun i L ies 
for fraud and abuse of power. A relaLionship sysLem is subject to persona I istic 
objectives such as nepotism, d ispropori, ionaLo bench" Ls Lo particular cliques, and 
other non efficiency based corrupt behavior. I'inns in Lhe same industry can 
establish relationships, often Lhrough industry associations, Lo engage in 
oligopolistic or cartel type behavior, it is difficult to terminate 
relationships; reciprocal obligations built up over Lime may result in Type '?. 
errors (continuation of support well beyond rational assessments). 
In many societies the social costs of relationship systems far outweigh 
their efficiency gains. Yet it appears this has not been the? case in Japan. Why? 
The .sanctions against and penalities for abusing trust arc? high. The most 
important sanction is Lhe competitive marketplace, if a relaLionship becomes 
persistently less efficient Lhan alternatives, eventually iL will wither away. 
The discipline of the marketplace is reinforced by the competitive, ambitious 
drive of many Japanese individuals and institutions. The incentive system rewards 
good performance and makes poor performance embarrassing and shameful, as well as 
economically costly, fhose perceived as not living up Lo Lhe obligations of 
existing relationships suffer tremendous loss of reputation, making them less 
reliable partners for any future business, kopufafional costs are reinforced by 
the high value placed upon sLatus 
Many Japanese apparently approach relationships conditionally, with a 
healthy degree of skepticism and latent mistrust, it is not accidental that 
companies simultaneously seek a main bank relationship and in aggregate borrow 
most of Lheir loans from other, frequently competitor, financial instiLutions. 
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And if is not dec identa I LhaL main banks monitor Lh(?ir major c I ieriLs, and indeed 
that partners in all re? I aL ionsh i p dr*r*<.incj(?rn(?nLs c?ngagc in SOUK? degree of ongoing 
aion i Lor i ng of each other. Nonei.he less , Lo develop good, sLrong re I <j Li oris 
part io ipants must regard each ol.her as LrusLworLhy, dnd Lo lie willing Lo rely upon 
informal agreements raLher than formal oontraoLs for much of Lhe conduct of 
business. It is Lypically assumed LhdL whoever one does repeated t)usiness with is 
LrusLworLhy. And the el H o oenLral government bureaucracy has boon deeply 
trusted, a I; least until recently. 
lhe various types of keiretsu business groups (financial, vertical, 
enterprise, distribution) embody re I aL ionsh ip arrangements among independent buL 
affiliaLed companies. Ihere is an exLonsive MLerature on keireLsu: see, for 
c?xample. Aoki (193(3) and Gerlach (1993). lhe? six c i Ly l)anks wiLh Lhe largesi. 
number of main bank re I aL ionsh ips are core members oi' the? 31 g Six i'inancial 
keiretsu: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo, formed out of prewar /aibatsu; and 
Dai ichi, luyo, and Sanwa. However. Lhe main bank system is not the same as the 
big Six keiretsu; oLher large banks also have main bank relationships. l.n 
particular, the Industrial bank of Japan. Lhe largest long Lerm credit bank, has 
had as many main bank relationships wiLh listed companies as Lhe average big 6 
city banks: with its own business group of affiliated companies, it must be 
included as a major player in the main bank system (see the ehapLor by Pachor). 
While? all core members of a particular financial business group have? the 
member bank as their main bank. Lhe? bank also has a main bank relationship wiLh 
other4 large firms and, through the syndication process, the? firms often borrow 
less from their keiretsu financial insfitub ions (Lhe main bank, Lrusf bank, 
insurance? companies) than they do from non -members , While? Lhere? may be? benefits 
for the main banks in having a keiretsu sysLem. certainly Lhe? application of the 
main bank mode?! in other countries docs not roguire Lhe? forma Lion of affiliated, 
autonomously managed, groups of business firms. 
three further aspecLs of Japanese industrial organization have? some 
relevance for the operation of the main bank system, first, stock ownership in 
almost all large industrial corporations and financial institutions is widely 
dispersed: ownership is separated from control which, in normal circumstances, is 
exercised by a self ••perpetuating autonomous professional management. Management's 
stated goals are to benefit all its sLakeholders. including importantly iLs 
workers, not simply to maximi/e shareholder value. Corporate governance is 
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exorcised through the main bank system, and control can shiTi; from management Lo 
the main bank in times of disLress. Second. Lake over1 of companies has not been a 
major instrument of corporate governance or of company diversification inLo 
unrelaLed produoL lines. Mergers have been of weak firms into sLronger, usually 
mediated by the main banks. fhird, particularly in Lhe rapid growth era but even 
subsequently, firms tended to sLay wiLhin their own narrowly defined industry; 
American style eong lomeraLes did not emerge. A major reason was that rapid growLh 
first of domesfie markets and Lhon Lhe ability Lo compete in foreign markets 
absorbed the management capabilities of (enterprises, and kept them in Lhe 
industries they knew best. 
Importantly, Japan has an excellenL system of sound cenLral government 
admin isLraL ion. Over Lime i I; developed an elite t)ureaucracy LhaL is generally 
respected, Lrusted, and in whom politicians have? vested great power because of 
their presumed capability, honesty, and idenf \ iication with the national interest 
(or at least each Ministry's avowed perception of the national interest). Those 
on the fast track In the Ministries are able, recruited from Lhe Tew elite? 
universities, and promoted from wiLhin; only the Minister and par I iameritary Vice? 
Minister are outsider, political appointments. VS. 
A I; the apex is the Ministry of finance which, among other responsibilities 
(such as making the budgoL and designing and implementing the Lax system) 
oversees, promotes, guides, and supervises, and otherwise establishes and monitors 
the rules of Lhe game for the financial system, and especially Lhe banking system. 
'I rust and confidence? in the Ministry of finance and other (economic ministry 
bureaucrats have had important implications for the financial system, (especially 
in the high growth era when bureaucratic power was greatest. I veryone believed 
that the Ministry of Ijnance and hank of Japan guaranteed bank safety. Close 
supervision (monitoring) would prevent mismanagement, excessive risk--taking, 
fraud, lhe system was believed in even though it was opaque and government 
officials have? relied on administrative guidance rather than law in composing and 
implementing rules and affecting behavior. The sanctions against poor 
performance, much less corrupt behavior, by government officials were severe: 
? See the papers prepared for the World liank Workshop on the Roles of the Civil 
Service \n Japanese bconomic Growth (1993). lor a rational choice approach see Rosenbluth 
(1989) and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993). 
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loss in Lhe promoi, ion game, reduced posL rel; iromeriL j'oh opporLuniLies, aL Lhe 
extreme, disgrace a I I in a quite imperfect labor market (or senior managers <jnd 
government of fie id Is . 
the process a llocaf ing bank credit Lo spec: i f i c firms in Japan has been 
based on objective? criteria. wiLhouf serious problems of direci; bureaueral; ic 
intervention. Known instances of direct bribery and corruption of governmerii, 
officials to influence specific loan decisions are \/cry few. While some? 
undoubtedly wore noL discovered, and oLhers hidden from public view, corruption 
has not been a serious problem for government adminisLrafion of the? financial 
system. IL has been basically honest and effective, especially in comparison wiLh 
many developing market economies and ISIs. 
In practice the? Ministry of Li nance and Hank of Japan have? boon insula Led 
from the direct corruption more? pervasive in poll Lies, \3 ill is is not Lo say 
they have? complete? autonomy. I hey certainly were responsive Lo Lhe electoral and 
other needs of the Liberal Democratic Party politicians in power; the "iron 
triangle" of eo/y. mutually supportive, and beneficial big business (including 
finance), LDP politicians, and governmenL bureaucracy relationships has been an 
important reality. As in cy^ry country, Japanese banks have? had a strong vested 
interest in shaping the regulatory system and government financial policies to 
their benefit. I heir relationships were based on general support of the system, 
not on specific favors, lhe city banks were? among the largesi: legal contributors 
to the liberal Democratic Party, and Lhey undoubtedly made? contribuLions dirocLly 
to individual political leaders as well. 
3 lo be elected and stay in office, politicians have had to maintain and somehow pay 
for a large staff, and are expected to make? gifts of $/h 11)0 to the families of 
constituents on the occasion of each birth, death, or marriage. Lhey raise much of these 
funds through business contributions which are frequently related to regulatory 
restrictions (such as the Sagawa trucking license scandal), government purchases (notably 
the system of rigged government construction contracts, Lermod dango). lax tax enforcement 
(such as small business evasion of income faxes), or stock market scandals (the Recruit 
case), that these arrangements are generally tolerated so long as Lhey stay wiLhin limits 
suggests a series of implicit social compacts which can only be addressed through 
comprehensive pelitical reform. 
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Public: confidence in the n?gu I aLory auLhor i I: ies and in Lhe? banking system 
and the? securities industry was shaken in the early 1990s when a series oi' 
financial scandals surfaced in Lhe a LLermath oi the burs Ling of Lhe.? slock dnd land 
price bubbles. Ihese demonsLraLed noL corruption but the app a rent lack of 
compeLenco of government of fie id Is in su[)erv is ion, and Lhe ir Lolorance of slesi/y 
I \' not outright illegal pracl, ices as interim measures in Lhe process of financial 
institution adjusLment Lo new market realities. In mid 1993) belief that Lhe 
regulatory authorities would continue Lo protect Lhe? safety of the banking system, 
and especially deposiLors, remained sLrong but was more? coridi Lioria! than before; a 
few small banks thought to be in particular difficulty oven had considerable 
deposit withdrawaIs. 
3 financial System ArchiLeeLure and Lhe Japanese? Lxperionce 
Lhe government designs the architecture? of Lhe financial system; the market 
gives its substance?, fills its halls, and oven alLers the design itself. 
Government policy establishes the? framework whereby system stability is 
maintained, and determines whether competition in financial markets flourishes or 
is emasculated. Lo the extent that market forces predominate, they bring about 
changes in structure? as new financial markets, instruments, and institutions 
develop in response to markoL demand for Lhom. Governmental authorities Lhe 
ministry of finance, central bank, financial institution supervisors play a 
major role. At the micro level they oversee banks and other financial 
institutions with prudential regulation and supervision. Put they do far more? 
than that. They build and modify the institutional structure? and hence the 
industrial organization of finance?; they sel; and enforce Lhe rules of the game. 
Japanese policymakers in Lhe early 19b()s had to address the same issues of 
financial system structure? and policy faring developing market economies and ISIs 
today. Once independence was restored in April 19b3 Japanese policymakers had Lhe? 
freedom to alter, amend, or accept the existing structure, Lo create new 
institutions, and In particular to implement their own financial policies, this 
section addresses important issues of financial structure? and policy lor 
developing market economies and LSfs, and discusses how Japanese policymakers and 
decision makers, public and private, have? deal L with them, ihese include? banking 
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based financial sysLe?ms; universal versus commcrc \<\ I bank systems; bank safeLy; 
inforosL raLe policy and financial n?press ion; and long Le?rm and dirocLod credii, policies1 
3. .1. Hanking and Securities MarkoLs 
A securities market based sysLem and a banking -based sysLem can develop 
simultaneously while being of vastly differing significance? in dii'ierent Lime 
periods and tor (J i iteront playe?rs. iioLh requires a set or prudc?nLial and 
adminisLrat i ve rules and revju I ai. ions , in oLher words an appropriaLe i nsfi Lut lOna I 
structure and administrative framework. in order Lo function effectively and 
efficient ly. the important issue is Lhus whether Lhe inst i LuL lona I strueLure\ Lhe 
incentives structure?, and Lhe rules of Lhe game should discriminaLe substantially 
in favor CM Lher of banks or of socuri'Lies markets; or whether they should bo more. 
neutral in order to let market forces deLormine the relative? importance? of each 
over time. 
As a practical matter, unLil a late stage? of economic development 
securities markets will not be? Lhe dominant source? of business external finance 
for the corporate sector as a whole: or probably oven for large firms. Which 
financial institutions can most effeeLivoly and efficiently mom'Lor borrowers is 
key. The economics of information collection and monitoring, and Lhe reluctance? 
of firms to subject the?mse? I ve?s Lo significant d isolosure?, limit Lhe demand for 
public see:ur i t ies issue?, lejually important, there? is a Le?rm mismatch l)e?twe.?en 
savers and investors; in relatively low income? countries few individual savers are 
willing to Lake on the risks of impersonal securities investments or to make? long 
term commitments in financial asse?ts. The risks are correcLly perceived as higher 
In countries with recent experiene:es of inflation or substantial degrees of socio 
political as we'll as economic uncertainty. 
Many LSIs are seeking Lo privatize Lheir mamme)th stale enterprises, often 
by widespread distribution of equity Lo individuals at low prices. Such programs 
will almosL inevitably, and desirably, lead to the creation ejf stock marke?fs to 
facilitate changes in ownership of the? outstanding share?s. That can have? 
important advantages, such as ine:reas ing pressure to create? adequate informaL ion 
systems and transparency and providing markol;-dcyLorminod price information 
(signals) about yields and valuai/ions. However, in Lhe at)sene:e of ove?rwhe?lming 
(and costly) incentives, if is unlikely Lhat securities markets in I Sis will 
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become a major source of new funds lor' 'I is Led companies in Lhe foreseeable? future. 
And iL remains to be seen wheLher irisi. i LuL iona I investors (such as muLual funds) 
Lhat do emerge will be more? ei'TicienL and c? f" f"cM:Li \/c? monitors Lhan government 
bureaucrat s (prob*.ib ly so) or1 bank managers (unclear). 
The postwar Japanese financial system owed much fo ifs early postwar, 
wartime?. and prewar instiLutionaI herii.age. I'he Ministry of I inanec? o[)Led for a 
system of bank loan --based finance for industrial corporations. IL used regulatory 
restrictions' and economic disincentives Lo severely inhibit corporate bond issue 
and the development of a secondary markeL (sec? Lhe Karris oyer chapter). Isscntially 
only public utilities and long -term credit banks could issue bonds in any 
quantity, and Lhis was done? mainly Lhrough non arm.s length placements. fquify 
issue was expensive for management corii.rolled firms both because dividends were 
paid out of after- Lax profits while? inLoresL payments were? a deductible expense 
and because the prewar custom of new stock issue? aL par rather than markeL 
prevailed (well into the 19/()s). lhe issuance of commercial paper for short form 
finance was not allowed until 1.98'/. business, growing rapidly and always \n need 
of now loans for working capital and fixed investment, had no choice but Lo borrow 
from banks. 
the basic rationale for Japanese? policymaker discrimination in favor of 
bank finance over corporate bond or equity issue? lay in their perception that 
savers in the early postwar period wanted safe, liquid, short term financial 
assets. I'he inflationary experience was Loo traumatic and recent; financial and 
real wealth was low and relatively equally distributed: Lhe? sLock market had 
difficulty absorbing the shares released through Lhe? /aibafsu dissolution program. 
Moreover, only banks had bond underwriting experience and expertise from prewar. 
and the Occupation • imposed Article 6S of the Securities and I xchange law of 1948, 
based on the American Glass SfoagalI Act. separated banking and underwriting or 
dealing in securities. Only in the 19/0s and '80s were the restrictions on 
corporate bond issue substantially eased, considerably later than was desirable. 
Nonetheless, these? policies were an essential component of building a strong 
banking system during the rapid growth era. 
Hanking System Structure 
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Inasmuch (is universal banking was f)roh ib i'fed under Article? fib, the 
oporat i vcA issue for Japan was what banking sysLom structure would t)o most 
appropr iate. What are the? respective benefits and costs of a system founded 
primarily on nationwide? branch banks or on larger numbers of local and regional 
banks? Nationwide banks may generate economies of scale, scope, and portfolio 
diversification, but local banks may be better able to monitor local borrowers 
than local branches of nationwide banks. Moreover, should commercial banks be 
expected to lend for all categories of borrowers, or is if desirable to have? 
specialized financial institutions for agriculture and small business to overcome 
harmful market imperfections? In substantial pari; as a consequence of its 
historical evolution, Japan's banking structure was functionally specialized. 
the Japanese financial authorities ratified and where? necessary created a 
system of specialized financial institutions and segmented financial 
markets. \4 the dozen or so nationwide city banks, including the subset of six 
major main banks, were to provide short term and to some extent longer-term loans 
to big business, local banks, mutual savings banks, and credit associations were 
to lend to medium and small firms. Agricultural cooperatives lent to farmers. 
The seven trust banks financed commercial real estate and industrial projects with 
longer term loans; the long-term credit banks made term loans to finance large 
enterprise fixed investment. I he government established and owned financial 
institutions to finance priority activities. the largest and most important \n 
the high growth era were the Japan Development bank and the Ixporf Import Hank of 
Japan. 
the fair Irade Act of 194/ set a b% 'limit on Japanese bank ownership of a 
company's shares, in contrast to the prohibition of ownership in US law and UK 
custom. However, once independence was restored the authorities amended the law, 
in July 1.9b3, to allow Japanese banks to purchase? up to WZ of a company's equity; 
4 The most comprehensive? description in llig'lish of the Japanese? financial system 
institutions, markets, assets and liabilities, interest rate system, monetary policy 
has been prepared by the bank of Japan and appears in Suzuki (198/). 'there are? a number 
of good analyses available of the high growth era and of the subsequent period of 
deregulation, including the chapter by llamada and lloriuchi in Yamamura and Yasuba (198/), 
chapters by foranishi, and Kurosawa and Kitagawa, in Patrick and Park (1994), Cargill and 
koyama (1.988), and Suzuki (1980 and 1986). 
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one purpose? was 1;o make? b<jnk client relationships closer and stronger ('leran ish i', 
1.993, [). ??.). However, Inst i tut mna I ly and legally those re I at ionsh i ps were even 
closer1 in the German system whore, in addition to unlimif(?d (?(]u f t.y ownership, de 
facto control over proxies and representation on Lhe outside? Hoard have? given 
German brinks what are conventionally viewed as substantially greater powers, 
though Haums argues should powers were? limited to a relatively small number of 
linns and were not really exercised (see the chapter on Germany). 
The predominant source of funds for the financial sysi.em was deposits, 
particularly Lhe saving deposits of households as their saving rates rose 
dramatically and there were? few sale alternative? financial assets, Iven 
government financial inst if ui; ions were financed primarily by private saving 
through their borrowing of post office? savings deposits. Central bank r.redii; 
sufficient to su[)port money supply growth while? maintaining price stability was 
provided through cheap loans and discounts to the city bank?; (more or less in 
proportion to their size), which in turn 'lent to large? businesses or to finance 
exports, and purchased (on an allocated basis) bonds issued by the long-term 
credit banks, electric power companies and other utilities, and the small number 
of qualified corporate clients. Establishment of new bank branches was profitable 
since deposit interest rates were? kept artificially low while? the? demand for loans 
was high. The Ministry of finance? controlled the number and allocation of 
branches, and used that as an incentive device to ensure bank compliance with its 
guidance. Saving was more? widely dispersed geographically than large? enterprise 
fixed investment, and the inter -bank call market, in which city banks borrowed 
substantially and persistently, reduced disequilibria in the segmented deposit and 
loan markets. 
?).[) Nanking System Safety and Stability 
A basic issue, which certainly has shaped Japanese policymakers thinking, 
is how to maintain the safety and stability of the? banking system. to what extent 
and how should depositors be protected? Should individual banks be allowed to 
fail? I low can the moral hazard of excessive risk--taking by banks be? overcome?? io 
what extent eio measures to promote safety conflict with the objective of enhancing 
financial market competition? Can high minimum capital adequacy ratios substitute 
for government guarantees in protecting depositors? these
 (\re major questions 
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under debate in Lhe finance? I i LeraLure. In my view high edpiLal adequacy 
requiromonLs. prudent id I requ I aL ion , pro acLive supervision, and Lransparonoy dre 
collectively Lhe appropriate [)ohcies. (.iovernmoni, guarantees, explicit or1 de 
facto, not only raise moral hd/drd problemis t)uL increase Lhe likelihood Lhe 
government both will intrude excessively in lodn decisions .ind oLher aspects of 
bdnk behavior, and will rind itself committed, or unable Lo refuse? Lo commit, Lo 
further1 loans to refinance failing [)anks or indusLrial com[)dnies (the soft 
budgeting problem) . 
lhe reality, however, is LhaL, like early postwar Japan, banks \\\ almost 
all developing market economies and ISIs are undercapitalized, have? limited 
prospect?; for raising additional capital, and have serious bad loan problems. 
disclosed or undisclosed. lhe overhang of huge and sLill rising bad loans Lo 
state enterprises means that banks in some? ISIs are insolvent. A soluLion oi' 
these problems through sustained growLh sounds good but is ameliorative? only. 
More likely they will bo resolved, as was done in early posLwar Japan, Lhrough a 
combination of de facto bankrupLcios and resLructuring. inflation (which reduces 
the real value of loans and deposits); sequestering of existing ("old") bank 
deposits and loans in order to start fresh with "new" depos i L and loan accounts; 
cleaning up the bad debt overhang over time by writing off equity and "old" 
deposits to the extent necessary; and the revaluation of corporate? real assets 
once inflation ends (or as if proceeds). 
the hand of history has been heavy on Japanese financial policymakers, as 
for Germany. Lhe United States, and indeed most countries. Lor its first fifty 
years .Japan's modern banking system was highly competitive and lightly rogulaLed. 
with easy entry and scant supervision. However, recurring bank failures and 
financial panics, culminating in the Hanking (iris is of 19/7, genera Led a strong 
regulatory commitment to banking system stability, safety, and orderliness that 
has persisted to the? present. Lhe posLwar authorities conservatively created a 
system and pursued policies which in practice not only fully protected all 
deposits and depositors but prevented any bank from failing. Deposit insurance 
was not a factor; indeed a government compulsory deposit system was not 
establ ished until 19/1.. 
While serving as the lender of last resort, the monetary authorities did 
not want to create moral hazard disincentives or condone? mismanagement, lhe 
policy approach was two fold: Lo enact prudential regulation and carefully 
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supervise banks, intervening \\\ bank management when necessary; and to impose 
coiling interest rates on deposits and loans with a sufficiently wide spread that 
even the most man] ina I think, reasonably managed, would be profitable, since 
investment demand and hence demand for 'loanable funds was high (.see the chapter by 
Ueda). the enfry of new banks was prohibited. While relatively high mini mum 
capital asset ratios (10!!!) were required in principle, in practice they were? very 
low, on the order of ? to 4%; the other policies were sufficient to guarantee bank 
safety. Capital--asset ratios became an issue only as bank inc.] was deregulated and 
especially after major Japanese banks became significant international players, 
leading to the 1988 IMS capital adequacy ratio arrangements. 
the banking system was indeed very stable? and safe throughout the high 
growth era. No bank failed; a lew merged. Realized loan losses were very low in 
part because loans were? generally well collaterali/ed but also because rapid 
growth resulted in few outright business failures of any significance. there were 
modest economic losses borne by banks as they rescued and restructured firms in 
distress, typically by reducing interest rates on loans and extending repayment 
schedules. Perhaps the most significant cost of the otherwise very effective 
policies promoting stability was that bank management, especially \n small banks, 
became complacent, and was ill-equipped to operate ycry effectively \n the more? 
competitive financial environment deregulation has brought. 
low Interest Rates and linancial Repression 
A key issue in financial development policy is whether interest rates 
should be determined by supply and demand in the marketplace or be set at low 
ceiling rates through government policy, low interest rate policies reduce the 
cost of funds to investors and the return to savers, thereby providing incentives 
to investment and disincentives to saving. Under a policy-mandated low interest 
rate regime, demand exceeds the supply of funds and credit rationing becomes 
essential. Credit rents the difference between ceiling interest rates and 
market interest rates are created and somehow allocated among direct and 
indirect participants. The credit allocation process accordingly becomes 
distorted by pol ifica I factors, personalistic considerations, rent--seeking 
behavior, and corruption. To maintain the system enfry has to be limited. 
competition among financial institutions and financial instruments constrained, 
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and capilal outflows to foreign counlriess restr icled . Ihis is Lhe slandarel 
doscri pi; i on of i i nanci a I repress i on . 
low interest rate? (financ i a I repression) policies have long been crifici/ed 
on both theoretical and empirical grounds, \!> lor almost all economies the 
lack of saving is a more severe constraint lhan lack of investment demand. lo lhe 
extent savings are real inlorest rate elastic Lhe evidence is mixed on marginal 
changes, but positive where large changes occur due l;o substantial reductions in 
inflation then low interest rate policies are counter productive. On Lhe 
investment side, low inferesL rates create credit rents and distort erediL 
allocation away from the most productive irivestmerii, projeoLs. Corruption in the 
distribution of credit rents occurs aL Lwo levels: LhaL of individual banks or 
bankers, Lheir borrowers, or1 reguiaLors; and, as political economists have poinLed 
out, Lhe insfituLionaii/ed corruption of the poiiLical system whereby cred'it remits 
become a significant source? of finance lor the political leadership. 
lhe degree o(; financial repression is very important both as a policy 
matter and theoretically. There? is no substantial theoretical case or empirical 
evidence? that negative real interest rales enhance economic and financial 
development. I ven with positive? real rales the? distortions can be? large. As an 
i Nustralion, assuming national credit outstanding amounts to b()X of GDP and the? 
gap between ceiling and market interest rates is 10 percentage points, then the? 
annual credit rents amount to h% of Cl)l}. These rents are redistributed from 
savers and taxpayers to those? who obtain them. Iheso static cos Is of credit rents 
rationing are surely smaller than Lhe dynamic consequences of inefficient resource 
a I local ion. 
A recent theme? in the "new institutional economics" analytical approach is 
that a small degree of financial repression may, on net balance?, be beneficial or 
even required in order to build financial institutions needed for economic growlh. 
Lhe analysis begins with the proposition, certainly well recogni/od by all 
practical policymakers, that institutions matter. In the? real world of imperfect 
t) The classic treatments are Shaw (19/3) and McKinnon (.19/3): more recent analysis is 
provided by fry (1988) and McKinnon (.1.991). The World liank World Development Report 
(1.989), especially chapters 3 and 4, is replete with discussion, examples, and data on 
financial repression and the? costs thereof, lor a comparative evaluation of financial 
repression \n Japan. Korea, and Taiwan sec? Patrick in Patrick and Park (1994). 
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markets and imporfe?cf and asymme?fr ical 'ly d isfr ibute?d ini ormaL ion if is sometimes 
ne?cessary Lo provide? incentives (direct or implieiL subs id ies) to create? and 
manage effectively appropriate insLitut ions. A sLronq, e?f lecLive, and sale 
banking system is'essential in a very uncertain world l;o mo[)ili/e savings and LO 
allocate? credit Lo productive? business uses. 
Assuming Lhat saving is i ni.eresL irte last ic, few a IfernaLi vos Lo savings 
deposits are available?, and deposiLors have? a high pre?fore?nce? for safe?ty ove?r 
yield. Lhen low interest rates on de?posii;s are? an e?fie?cfive? way Lo subsidi/e? 
banks. Coiling loan interest rate?!, are? designed in principle so that banks retain 
part of this subsidy Lhrough a wide? spread and pass on pari; of it to borrowe?rs. 
Such a banking system should be autonomous, objective?, and raLional \n its loan 
decisions, subject Lo prudonLial regulation and supervisory ove?rvie?w, I he? e.ie?gre?e? 
oi e:redif rent that borrowe.?rs obtain is based upon objective? performance e:riLe?ria 
(output growth, cost re?duc:tions, e?xporl;s) as ei(?fermined l)y industrial pol ie.:y. In 
this view business credit rent seeking induces growth se?e?k irig outcomes 
(per(ormance indexed rent see?kirig behavior). In Lhis view, Lhc? degree of 
financial repression should equate at the? margin its insti Lut ion build irig and 
allocative benefits and its saving disincentive? and rent-seeking costs, and should 
be decreased as institutions become? stronger. 
the early postwar development of the .Japanese? banking system is put "forth 
as an outstanding example of Lhe? success of a mode?st degree? of financial 
repression (se?e? most chapters in Part I, though Pamsoyer takes exception), 'lhe 
argument is that the early postwar banks were fragile and required the implicit 
subsidies of low interest rates and wide spreads to build up internal reserves and 
become strong over time, and the? entire system had been made? safe by restrictions 
on entry and other means of implicit subsiely. Credit rents were used for 
institution build ing and to prewide? incentives Lo appropriaLe corporate? 
performance? and in Lhis sense we?re? desirable?. 
Pank interest rate ceilings we?re ope?rafive? mainly on Lhe deposit side. 
Nominal ceiling loan rates sot by law or agree?me?nt we?re? neiLher comprehons ive? \n 
coverage nor. more important, binding where? they did apply. Hanks required 
compensating balances and fee business against loans to raise stated inferesl; 
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ra tes above? Lhe? e:ei 1'ine.js, I I noL Lo comp I cvLo I y marke?L e: I e?ar i nej l e v e l s . \6 Aok i 
amnong oLhers has plans ib' ly argued LhaL some c r e d i t re?nLs we?re? capLure?d by "we' l l -
per form inc.)" i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s s ince Lhere was some variance? in loan Lerms even 
among c r e d i t w o r t h y bo r rowers ; Lhe micro (evidence l;o Lest Lhis p r o p o s i t i o n i s , not 
s u r p r i s i n g l y , very I imi t e d . 
A cons ide rab le p o r t i o n o f Lhe c r e d i t ren ts o f r o g u l a L i o n In t he era o f h igh 
business demand f o r Lund.', accrued Lo banks. How d i d the? banks al locate? those? 
rents? C e r t a i n l y noL Lo loan o f f i c e r s ; borrowers were noL at)lc? Lo obLain 
p r e f e r e n t i a l access t o loans by b r i b i n g Lhem. Part we?nf inl;o bank p r o f i t s (shared 
w i t h the government as faxes and o the rw ise mosLly reLa inod as a d d i t i o n s t o 
c a p i L a l ) ; [)arL we?nt i n t o hi(jh(?r s a l a r i e s f o r managers o f t)anks than for i n d u s f r i a l 
e n t e r p r i s e s ; par i , funded managemonL i ne? IT i e; ie?nc ie?s ; and some? modessL [)orf ion we?nL 
t o very large d e p o s i t o r s who a lso were? ab le t o evade c e i l i n g infe?re?sf ra tes 
( P a t r i c k . 1966). 
lhe ren ts c rea ted in Lhe? h igh growth e?ra by low i n f e r o s I; r a t e pol ieie?s were 
r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l , es t ima ted t o be \.l% o i ' CiNP in 1 9 6 6 / 0 and VAX \n 19/1. '/!> by 
f e r a n i s h i (1993, p. ?9) and some?whaf le?ss by llcda (chap te r 8 ) . Whi'le Lhe main 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s were large? L inns, and the banks Lhomsol vos, Lhe cos ts o f f i n a n c i a l 
r ep ress ion were borne by depos iLors who re?ce?ive?d very low rea l re?furns and by 
small bus ine?sse?s which pa id o l iejopol i s L i c a I ly e]e?te?rmined h igh intc?re?st raLess. 
Rent se?e?king and ce)rru[)L i on , i n d i v i d u a l or i n s t i t u t i o n a l , have? not be?e?n a 
pervasive? e:haracter i s t ic o f Lhe? Japane?se? f i n a n c i a l syste?m, so d i s t e n t i o n o f e:re?dif 
a l l o c a t i o n c r i t e r i a we?re? minimi/e?ei. l h i s is not l)(?cause Ja[)anese? we?re nee:e?ssar i ly 
mo ra l l y s u p e r i o r , a l though the p e r c e p t i o n t h a t Japanese banks, bankers , and 
r e g u l a t o r y bureaucra ts i n genera l are? honest and r e s p o n s i b l e seems v a l i d . Rather, 
c r e d i t ren ts from f i n a n c i a l r ep ress i on were not very large?, w h i l e Lhe sanc t ions 
r e g u l a t o r y , economic, and repu ta l / i ona l were severe . 
6 Su/uki (198/) esLimafe?s the? e?i feetive? loan in terest rate? eiuring 1964 /3 was 8 \i)% 
for c i t y banks, and 9 \'M for local banks, lhe CNP de?flater rejse? at an annual average? 
rate of about ?% p r i o r t o the? 19/3 in 11 at ion; whi'le the consumer price? index rose more? 
rap id ly ( r e f l e c t i n g p r ice increases in serv ices) , wholesale and e?xporf pr ices were ve.?ry 
s tab le . Cei l ing rates on savings eje?pos i t s in real terms ranged be?fwoe?n s l i g h t l y pos i t i ve 
and s l i g h t l y negat ive. 
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lor compel nil i vo "lessons", the important fact about Japan's po I i cy of 
financial repression is that it was so modes i. <iri(] circumscribed in comparison with 
the experience of many developing market arid 1; rans form ing socialist economies. 
Official ceiling interest rates were perhaps several percentage points below 
market clearing rates; however, in real terms coiling loan interest rales were? 
positive and nominal rates were above Lhose in world markers. More imporlanL, 
since banks circumvented ceiling loan rales Ihe policies were effective mainly on 
the deposil; side. Ihe dramatic increase in savings nonetheless flowed into saving 
deposits both because of liquidity and preferential lax treatment and Ihe lack of 
alternative low risk financial or real assets. The greatest cost was that the 
oo/y system of regulated, low inferos I; rates and other components of financial 
repression persisted loo long. Inertia is a powerful force?, and if was nol until 
fundamental structural changes in Japan's macro economy occurred in the mid '19/Us 
that the shift to deregulation and libera I i/ation brought financial repression lo 
an end. 
3.b Directed Credit and long term I inancirig of business investment 
Related to financial repression but analytically and empirically separable 
are policy issues of directed credit and the long ••term financing of business 
investment. Should government policy make possible the provision of credit lo 
selected activities or industries at below market rales and with easy 
availability? if so, how should this be achieved through government or private 
financial institutions? Who should bear the costs of such credit subsidies? What 
activities should receive the benefit? Certainly a system of market based 
interest rates without financial repression but together with subsidized rates for 
certain activities is feasible, as American experiences in subsidizing credit for 
housing, student loans, and the like demonstrate. 
A case can be made that relatively cheap credit for exports is an efficient 
way to support an export orionted development strategy, particularly where other 
policies or market distortions make for disincentives to exporting. Similarly, a 
case can be made for relatively cheap credit for infrastructure investment 
public utilities, transportation, communications where external economies are 
significant, the most controversial component of directed credit policies is 
toward selected "strategic" winner industries (or smoothing the adjustment of 
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declining industries) thai; is, industrial policy. Cheap credfL is an important 
instrument for industrial policy, in pari; because Lhis form of subsidy is 
politically attractive since if is nol; readily transparent. 
I he Japanese government had a clear, straight forward, and relatively simple 
economic development and growth strategy as a follower nation behind Western 
I uropo and the US. Achieving this meant deepening industrialization as the basis 
of evolving comparative advantage and productivity growth; exports as the means to 
pay for essential imports, the balance of payments being the operative constraint 
on rapid growth; development ot infrastructure to support industrial activity; and 
basic reliance on private enterprises and market mechanisms to c<\rry out the 
strategy. Japan was to climb the development ladder by moving into ewer more? 
skill intensive, higher technology, and capital intensive industries in which 
entry of new firms was encouraged in order to create? competition in domestic 
markets protected from imports. An important policy instrument was the directed 
use of credit. 
Policies to provide preferential financing for exports had several 
dimensions, the hank of Japan rodiseountod short term export trade bills at a low 
rate based on the New York market. I he city banks played the? major role by 
lending to their exporting industrial clients and especially to the general 
trading companies and other trading companies that handled so much of the exports. 
the I xpord; Import l>ank made? longer term loans (the functional equivalent of 
supplier credits) on preferential terms to foreign purchasers of Japanese? exports. 
especially of ships as well as machinery and other capital goods, the Japan 
Development Hank was created to support the development of targeted industries, 
and some of them were involved in export production. Overall, the subsidy 
involved in export credits was not large, and exports had to meet the 
competitiveness tests of international markets, the disciplinary role of the 
export strategy was important, linns were judged on their readily observable 
export performance, so monitoring of performance was easy. 
Industrial policy in the late H M O s and 'f)()s targeted traditional basic 
industries steel, coal, rertili/er. electric power, transport, this 
subsequently shifted to prospective? winner industries (identified by the demand 
and industry structures of the United States and Western I -uropo) such as 
petrochemicals, aluminum, shipbuilding, commercia I aircraft, and later on 
computers and semiconductors, the basic approach was to rely on large private 
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i inns to carry out Lhe invesLment necessary Lo create a new, more sophisticaLed 
and more eompoLiLivc set of i rulus Lrf c^ i. cind lor government pel'icy Lo provide 
substantial incentives for key, targeted industries. A wide panoply of incentives 
were utilized; especially important wore import protection, Lax bonefiLs, and 
preferential access Lo credit aL below-average interest ral;es. 
As in oLher countries. the Japanese government had Lwo ways to shape* Lhe 
allocation of credit: it could lend funds under its direct control, and if could 
influence how private financial institutions lent theirs. Government lending was 
limited buL of some s ign i fieance; government influence over private lending was 
indirect, relying on the financial and incentive structures creaked rather than 
directly controlling the allocation of credit Lo specific industries, much less 
specific firms. lhe contrast wiLh Korea is noteworthy, as discussed by Nam and 
Kim; see also chapters by Park, and Park and Kim in Patrick and Park (199/1). 
Certainly Lhe banks and oLher financial institutions funding large 
enterprises were well aware of Lhe government's industry priorities, and 'lending 
by the Japan Development bank (JIM) and fxport Import bank provided signals 
regarding government policy. However, Ministry of finance directives to banks as 
to what industries to lend to ended in the mid 1%0s. lhe industrial patterns of 
bank lending were certainly broadly congruent with government industrial 
priorities, but this was because such loans were viewed as profitable and safe. 
IT is noteworthy that bank lending was much lower to those? few sectors doomed high 
priority by the government but judged by the banks as being less safe and 
profitable, notably ocean shipping. Indeed feranishi (in Patrick and Park, 1994) 
and others (see JDIJ. 1993) stress that in even the high growth era \n practice a 
significant proportion of government funding went to facilitate and smooth the 
structural adjustment process of industries in trouble or decline, to which banks 
were much less willing to lend, such as coal mining once oil became a cheaper 
energy source. 
Most subsidized directed credit programs were carried out directly through 
government financial institutions. Theoretically, the government could have 
generated its loanable funds in a number of ways, in practice, if relied 
predominantly and increasingly on the allocation of postal savings deposits 
through the Ministry of finance trust I "unci bureau to government financial 
institutions, financing by loans directly from the central bank or indirectly 
through fiscal deficits were adamantly rejected since that had been the major 
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cause oC the postwar inflation. I inancing by running a government budget surplus, 
theoretically possible, was not feasible politically (in thai; respect Lhe laiwan 
experience may be virtually unique). lhe government and i Ls financial 
institutions (most notably the Japan Development Dank) did borrow from abroad and 
serve as a de facto conduit for subslariLiaI World Dank loans for specific projects 
in the late 19D0s and early '60s, bui, in aggregate the amounts were relatively low 
compared to total business fixed investment. 
Reliance on, and utilization of. postal savings to finance directed credit 
programs) was important. If created the general perception that Lhe postal savings 
were being used productively. and Lhaf lending by governmenf financial 
institutions was not inflationary. S ign if ioanl; ly. if set a do facto floor on i;ho 
interest rates a I, which governmenf financial institutions could lend since they 
were required to cover the inferos I; cos I; of postal savings deposits, any loan 
losses, and be profitable. 
Perhaps most importantly, Lhe specific loan decisions of government 
financial institutions were not subject to political or1 government bureaucrat 
interference; they were rather we'll insulated from the sorLs of direct 
persona I isfic corrupt, or politically motivated pressures I.hat have plagued 
lending practices in so many other countries. Once broad policy parameters were 
established (export credits and the financing of fixed investment for 
infrastructure and the priority industrial sectors), credit was allocated by loan 
officers applying objective creditworthiness criteria. They evaluated the qualify 
and riskiness of projects, they required specific collateral, and they were tough 
on potential defaulting borrowers. Actual lending practices were conservative}, 
and were extraordinarily successful: there were virtually no cases of outright 
borrower failure, loan losses were very low, and the government institutions did 
not lose money. 
Japanese policymakers recogni/ed the central role of business fixed 
investment, and established an institutional structure} and a set of policies to 
provide preferential access to long term financing at relatively low cost for 
large firms, especially those in targeted sectors, the general theoretical 
rationales were market failure and term mismatch. On the one hand, uncertainty of 
success of investment projects and inadequate information to evaluate project 
feasibility and firm creditworthiness made the long -term commitment of funds 
appear even more risky than in fact was the case. On the other hand, savers 
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preferred safe, re I at i vo 'ly shorL Lerm i inane i a I assoLs, espec id I ly since? secondary 
markets wore? undeveloped and inflaLionary ('cars pers isted. 
Long-term fundi rig was supplied primarily by term loans made by government 
financial institutions, Ihe fhree long Lerm credii. banks, c i Ly banks, Lrusf [)anks. 
and life insurance companies (see Ihe Packer ohaplor and JI) I >, 1.993). Ihis was 
typically in the form of de faoLo syndication of project loans involving all these 
types of inst ituLions. The [)rivate long form credit banks, particularly l;he 
Industrial hank of Japan (IILJ), played Lhe central role, especially m projecL 
evaluation. Over time the main bank developed a greater capability and took a 
larger role In project evaluaLion of its clients. I'rojoci; loan syndication 
typically was organized by a long Lerm credit bank in close consultation with, or 
co organi/ation by, the borrowing firm's main bank. A close, symbiotic 
relationship developed between the main bank and Lhe long form credit banks, 
though the latter were careful i;o work with the full range of main banks, and not 
to identify particularly with any single Dig Six keiretsu. 
A significant source? of long-term funding in practice, not recorded in the 
data, was the rolling over of short term credits by the commercial banks, \n 
particular by the main banks to their clients as an integral component of Lhoir 
long term relationship. A main bank commitment to its relationship implied a 
promise to roll over short-term credits, and this was an important signal l;o the 
other lenders to its el lent. 
Dy law and practice the? Japan Development Dank played a significant buL 
more narrow role, complementary to private? financial insfiLutions. As of 1961, 
9OX of its outstanding loans for plant and equipment investment were to four 
industries electric power, ocean shipping, coal mining, and iron and steel 
while those of the long term erodiL and other private sector banks were 
distributed over a far wider range of industries. The JDD's main broader role was 
as an information producer for borrowing firms, thereby reducing agency cos Is. 
Through its close relationship with the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (Mil I) it could make firms aware of investment opportunities and 
government policies towards industry, especially Lhose wiLhout stable long form 
main bank relationships (lloriuehi and Sui, forthcoming). 
The JDU has been a successful exception to Lhe sad history in most 
developing market economies of governmenLowned development banks, precisely 
because it was constrained to be conservative in loan decisions, require: 
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collateral and soi/e and sell iL upon loan default, syndicate i' ts loans, and be 
prof'it making. I he JI)P> floor lending rate was at its cost of funds (fi.M), while 
fho nominal long form interest rate for private financial institutions was \\J% 
9.1Z (JIM. J993, P. 1.31, fable III 1.0); since a h.ypoLh(?i; iea I market clearing rate 
was somewhat higher, Lhe JIM loan subsidy was on l;he order of 3 fo fi percentage 
points, substantial but far less:; than in many developing market economies or I Sis. 
Credil rationing was more .significant in long term finance than in Lhe 
short form loan market. Small firms wore strongly discriminated against, their 
demand tar exceeded the supply made available Lo Lhem, I ven among large firms if 
mattered to some? degree whether they wore in priority industries or noL. Access 
to credit, once |)roject profitability, firm cred i LworLh iriess and specific 
coliateral requirements were meL, was probably more important in promoLing 
targeted industries Lhan was the favorable inLeresL rate? on loans. the main poinL 
is that there were many potentially profitable projects so lenders could behave 
conservatively; credit rationing direeLed funds to targeted rather Lhan oLhor 
uses, lhe relatively low long--l;erm inLeresL rates benefited companies both in 
cost terms and in providing a favorable numeraire for project evaluation. 
lhe effective interest rate on long term loans was positive, higher than 
for short term loans, and yet lower than (implicit) market long Lerm rates. The 
average effective rate was reduced by Lhe blending of rates on different 
components of the syndicated loan: lowest from government financial institutions, 
higher on the private long-term credil, bank portion, and (probably) highest on the 
main bank, other city bank, and trust bank portions. The private financial 
institutions offset, at least partially, their low nominal long Lerm rate by 
requiring compensating balances and high foes for other financial services. Long 
term credit banks required borrowing firms to purchase Lheir financial debentures 
(their main source of funds) as a compensatory offset. 
Policy support for relatively low long term interest rates came from two 
sources: Lhe flow through of cheap postal savings deposits, and the provision of 
cheap credit by Lhe Hank of Japan. The Hank of Japan provided for stable growth 
of the money supply primarily by lending fo the city banks (and only the city 
banks), which chronica I ly borrowed a substantial portion of their total funds from 
it. This policy was not inflationary because the government maintained a balanced 
budget, the increase over time in foreign exchange reserves was modest, and open 
market operations did not exist. Central bank loans and discounts were at low 
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rates, (incl hence very profitable. Not only were? Lhey rationed (e?sse?nt ia I ly t)y 
bank si/e? so long as the? t)anks followed Lhe guidance? of the authorities), 
collateral was required. The oily banks could use as collateral their holdings of 
financial debentures, the main source of funds lor the private long term credit 
banks. \n this way relatively low cost funds ['lowed from the central bank through 
the city banks to the? long-term credit banks. 
the financing of fixed investment for targe?ted infrastructure projects 
relied on the same? ultimate? sources of inexpensive funds postal savings and 
central bank credit but through somewhat different mechanisms. lhe central 
government directly owned the national railroad system and the telecommunications 
system, and local governments owned some? utilities, they we?r*c? financed by postal 
savings through the? liscal Investment and loan Program (I IIP) of the Ministry of 
finance. Privately owned utilities, most notably the nine? regional electric power 
companies that service? most of Japan, issued substantial amounts of bonds as we?I I 
as engaged in long-term borrowing from the JIM and private? institutions, their 
bonds were? also issued at relatively low interest rates and served as collateral 
for Hank of Japan loan?; to the? city banks. Ponei issue? by industrial corporations 
was severely restricted; they were purchased disproportionately by the main bank. 
Secondary markets were discouraged for all bonds: government, financial, 
uti I it ies. or corporate?. \7 
4 Hanking System Issues 
the issues addressed above? on financial system architecture? and government 
financial policy impinge? directly on the? policies and behavior of banks, three 
issues at this more micro level are? considered here?: corporate? governance; credit 
/ Secondary markerts for long te?rm financial instruments we?re? ve?ry thin, 'lhe best 
indicator of markerl; long term interest rates was the? se?e:onelary market yield on ben bonsai., 
the small eienomi nation bonds issued by the? ge)vernme?nt-e)wne?d Nippon Telephone and iele?graph 
Company that had to be purchaseel by new telephone subscribers anei which they en'Ton 
immediately sold over the counter, those yields we?re typically substantially above? 
nominal ceiling long term rates and several percentage points above effeerfive short term 
bank loan rates. 
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analysis, requisite h urrwi n resources, cirul use of eo I I afera I: and the financing of 
smal I business. 
4.1. The Governance of Hanks 
Who owns the banks, who controls them in normal circumstances, and in 
times of bank distress? Governance involves control over management and 
determination of basic business strategy, while leaving day today operations to 
the bank management. However, depending on the? ownership structure? and government 
policy, those who own or control may be much more intrusive?, going so far as to 
shape specific: loan decisions. Governance is particularly important in situations 
where financial markets are far from fully competitive; information is Imperfect. 
asymmetrically distributed, costly, and monitoring Is Important; and management is 
a relatively autonomous agent. Under these circumstances typical In almost all 
developing market economies and I SI s banks inevitably will have a certain 
degree of market power. 
A central issue, especially relevant in the context of less developed 
economies, and I Sis, is the potential for misuse of power particularly 
intrusion of non objective criteria into specific loan decisions by owners, by 
the government, or by autonomous bank managers themselves. State owned banks are 
directly subject to the policies and pressures of government bureaucrats, and at 
least indirectly to the political leadership, with all the potential tor the 
infusion of political, rent seeking, turf maximizing or other non objective 
criteria (see the chapter's on China. India, and Poland). At the other extreme is 
the situation where ownership Is in the hands of an industrial family or business 
group. (The cahpfer on Mexico describes the shift from private to state? ownership 
and back again to business group ownership.) there the danger Is that the 
business group will preferentially concentrate bank loans to its own enterprises. 
at the expense of potentially bettor loans, or minority shareholders, or depositor 
protection. Where? stock ownership Is widely dispersed, as \n the case of large? 
Japanese? financial institutions, then ownership and control are separated with 
great power vested in autonomous management. 
A basic: objective? of government prudential regulation and supervision, and 
disclosure requirements to enhance transparency, is to prevent the misuse of power 
by owners or managers, Hut, even when substantial ownership is private, in some? 
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countries the government exercises subsCanf ia I control over brink lending and 
related policies and practices, not just l,o specific industries or for specific 
activities but even to specified firms. (Korea Co II owing i' Ls privatization oi Lhe 
commerc ia I brinks in the e<.irly 19fU)s is a good example.) M.y presumpt ion is that, 
even aside from questions of personal or institutional corrupC i on , credit 
a I locations and loan decisions by qovcrnmonC bureaucrats are usually 'less 
efficient and eCfecfive Chan Chose made by bankers. 
Che managers of Japanese city banks and other large financial institutions 
have had greaC autonomy from shareholders. Stock is held predominantly by 
friendly industrial corporations to which the banks lend (and \n turn hold shares) 
but in a highly dispersed fashion in which typically no single company holds much 
more Chan \%. Hostile take-overs bids have been unheard of. Che president and 
Che board of directors (selected by the president) in almost all instances have 
been promoted from within, having risen over ?\) years or 'longer Chrough management 
ranks. Che Ministry of finance and bank of Japan seC the rules, supervise, and 
provide administrative guidance, but Chey do not intervene in bank decision-making 
or in personnel matters. Che rules of Che game of good behavior were rather 
specific and precise, monitoring by Lhe authorities were presumably raCher 
intensive and informed, and the incentives for playing the game greater growth 
of bank size and profits by obtaining branch licenses and cheap central bank 
credit were substantia I . 
In normal times governance was subCle and indirect. The corporate ethos 
valued firm size; Che status of a bank and its management depended more on its 
ranking in terms of assets than its return on assets or equity. Reputation and 
peer group pressure were? important, reinforced by the? system of delegated 
monitoring among Che main banks. Despite substantial variance \\\ profitability. 
banks moved along in a "convoy" of relatively stable growth and ranking. 
What happens when a bank fails into difficulty, even distress? In the high 
growth era that was never really an issue, given the policy and structure; i I; 
occurred for only a few small banks, and then the Ministry of finance? intervened 
reducing dividend rates, changing management, dispatching a Ministry of finance 
official to take over. In the worst case, the economically failed small bank was 
easily merged into a larger bank since i I; had the valuable asset of deposit 
collecting branch offices. All this was done quietly, discreetly, with little 
disclosure. With separation of ownership and managerial control, stockholders 
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have had little powe?r.. Dcpos iters, by far the lanjc?st cre?elifors, had the? pe)we?r Lo 
exit (it little cos I; but they virtually never did because? the?y believed the? 
safety of their deposits, and indeed of l;he bank, was guaranteed by the 
government. 
If may well be that serious governance problems for Japan's banks will 
emerge in the 1990s. I he overhang of bad loans seems to have put several large? 
banks as well as many .small ones info serious difficulty. Merger will noL be as 
easy a solution as earlier since deregulation has sharply eroded the franchise 
value of branch offices. Under Lhese new circumstances if will nonetheless be the 
Ministry of finance, assisted by the hank of Japan, that will exercise control, 
providing credit and fiscal incentives, behind the scene?. Hostile mergers through 
the stock market are very unlikely. 
A.?. Credit Analysis and Human Resource Requirements 
Providing finance requires that creditors have the capability to evaluate 
potential projects and corporate clients, and to carry out the provision and 
management of financial services. The single most important bank lending problem 
is how to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers. Risk assessment is not easy 
under the best of circumstances since information is imperfect, asymmetric, and 
costly to obtain, and the future is uncertain; some possible states of nature 
create losses beyond the control of the enterprise? or bank. lhe essence of credit 
analysis is monitoring, but monitoring under the main bank system is more than 
that. It includes evaluation of ne?w projects, evaluation and some influence on 
the performance and behavior of the enterprise's ongoing activities, and rescue or 
liquidation of a firm in acute? distress. 
Hanking and finance skills are particularly important where? the information 
infrastructure of accounting, auditing, e?conomic intelligence, and disclosure? are 
underdeveloped. The shortage? of human resources with such skills is a serious 
problem, particularly \r\ transforming se)cialist ee:onomies which have little 
history of such skill formation. One approach is initially to e:one:e?rrfrafe? skilled 
staff at a few institutions banks, deve?lopme?nt banks, institutional 'investment 
funds and ever the longer run build up the human resource? base through training 
and on-the-job learning and spread it through a wider number of institutions. 
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A complementary cjppr'Ocich is lo require specific collaleral against logins.. 
Collateral reducers lhe need for cosily credit analysis, pari, icu I <ir ly whore 
informs Li on about lhe borrower or a project's prospects <ir*c? I i mi Led. I ho ko.y 
credit decision then depends on the ability to determine the market value of Lhe 
asset used as collaleral, in erfoct substituting knowledge about Lhc collateral 
for knowledge about Lhe borrower. lhe problem is Lhaf owners of assets are not 
necessarily the best entrepreneurs, developers of projects, and managers. 
Japan's prewar and wartime experience \n operating and managing banks 
produced a (airly large number of commercial bank managers with substantial human 
skills. lhe Mi J provided an imporlanl reservoir of Lalent skilled in project 
appraisal and long lerm L inane ing; some wore transferred Lo Lhc? Jl)!> directly. 
which also received skilled sLaff from Lhe hank oi' Japan and other long lerm 
financial institutions. All banks have? spent considerable effort recruiting 
outstanding urn'versify graduates and developing staff capabilities. rc\n\orc(^i by 
the systems of permanent employment, job rotation, and compel, iLion for promotion 
based also on seniority within a hierarchical system (see Lhe Sunamura chapter). 
In particular the main banks developed strong monitoring capabi lilies regarding 
their major corporate clients, especially for ongoing activities and \n situations 
of trouble and difficulty. However, lhe immobile permanenl employment system, 
especially the policy not to hire mid career managers from other institutions, 
seriously inhibited the transfer of human skills from one? bank to another. 
Japanese financial insLituLions have? a long history of requiring specific 
collateral, especially against long- Lerm loans and bonds. Yel this has been 
regarded as one component of a bank client relationship, not as a substitute for 
developing that relationship, riant and equipment has typically been sequestered 
as collateral; since the scrap value? was relatively low. project evaluation 
required cash flow analysis as well. In the high growth era Lhere were enough 
entrepreneurs with good projects and with collateral (including Ihird party 
guarantees) that credit allocation worked effectively, lhe main bank system has 
always combined the use of collateral with intensive monitoring to ascertain a 
firm's future prospects, seeking to distinguish between poLential borrowers with 
excel lent growth prospects but little collateral and those? simply with sufficient 
assets. 
4.3 lhe financing of Small business Relative to large 
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Japan's industrial development strategy was based on the assumption large? 
linns were the engines of growth and should receive? credit on preferential terms, 
relative to everybody else. Accordingly, city banks were at the core? of the? 
financial system, and the? re?gional banks and particularly the? small(?r local 
financial institutions we?re? at the? pe?riphe?ry. In as much as the function of the? 
main bank system was to finance? large? industrial e?ni;e?rpr ise?s, if ei iscrim inate?d 
against smaller be)rre)we?rs. 
I inane ia I institutions ' b(?havior was fundame?nta I Iy r<\\A)^r conse?rvaf i ve. 
I hey e:e)uld afford to be? because, with such rapid g m w f h of output and so many 
profitable? investment opportun i f ie?s, business de?mand for loans short term as 
we? I I as long te?r,.i was [)e?rs'iste?nt Iy strong anei gmwirig rapidly. hanks wanfe?d to 
lend to sale (:omparne?s, and the?y tyf)ically re?quire?el collateral. large e?nfe?rpnse?s 
were genera I'ly regarded as safer1 borrowers than small one?s. 
Small enterprises in fact produce?d most of the industrial output and 
employed most of the industrial labor force. Most (\Ui have? access to short term 
credit, but at re?lative?ly high cost. Ihe?y were? rationed out of substantial aexess 
to long term funds. The government was little? help: the? JUIJ lent almost entirely 
to large? firms; and the Small liusinoss I'inance Corporation came? to play a 
significant role? only from the? 19/(')s (Caleior, 1938). Srnailer firms faced an 
oligopolistic loan marke?f, reinforced by marke?t s(?gmentaLion rules and practices. 
They had to pay substantially higher e?f recti ve? interest rates, even after 
adjusting for transactions e:osts anei risk; their cewipensat ing balances were much 
higher than the)se of large? firms. 
in fact default risk was low because lenders required full collateral from 
small borrowers. When borrowe?rs eiefaulted their collateral was seized and sold so 
the actual loan losses by financial institutions lending to small business were 
small during the high growth era. less than \l. During this period, reflecting 
their respective degree? of marke?f powe?r, in te?rms of re?turn en equity. cre?dif 
associations were the? most profitable, then mutual savings banks (sogo ginke). 
which in 198/ were transformed into se?e:ondf ie?r re?gional banks). re?gional banks, 
and least profitable? of all. city t)anks. Marke?f segmentaf ion apparently resulted 
in less than optimal allocation of loans by firm si/o ele?sp if e? an ae:five interbank 
call market. 
The main bank system as defined throughout this book was essentially only 
for large industrial firms, even though small e?nte?rprises typically claim se)me 
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form of main bank rolal; ionsh ip with their primary lending msf if ul.ion (sec? Lhe 
chapter by lloriuchi). Most fundamentally, Lhoro was no bank commiLmenL fo rescue 
or restructure? a small firm in distress. I he nature of the banking relationship 
was narrow; small firms (J id not issue bonds, have foreign exchange transactions, 
or generate other fee business, and banks did not own any of their equity. Much 
of the problem in lending l,o small business was the lack of information, i;he cost 
of obtaining if, and hence Lhe diffieulLy in ovaluaLing Lhe creditworthiness of 
small business borrowers and their collaLoral. Monitoring oi" company performance 
accordingly was far less fborough; Lhe costs outweighed any benefits). 
there were? other imporLanL sources of small business crediL, notably the 
huge amounts of Lrade credit, large manufacturing firms and large trading 
companies became de facto financial iriLermediaries. borrowing from Lheir main bank 
syndicate and providing credit Lo related subsidiaries, subcontractors, and 
wholesalers since U\ the normal course of business they developed superior access 
to information about their creditworthiness. 
Venture capital institutions to provide risk capital for new, small 
entrepreneurial start ups did not exist in Lhe high growth era. and have been slow 
to develop subsequently. New small firms had to finance themselves just like new 
firms everywhere; the owner's savings, borrowing against Lhe owner's real assets, 
and credit guarantees by relatives and friends. Yet the entrepreneurial drive Lo 
set up one's own firm, fo be one's own boss, is sLrong in Japan; every year more? 
new small firms were established than in the United States, and every year more? 
failed or otherwise exited. And some grew fo become large and well known such 
as Sony, Honda, and Kyocera. 
b lessons from Japanese financial Development 
lhe main bank system was at Lhe apex of the Japanese financial system in 
the high growth era and arguably still is. In important respects it has 
opitomi/ed Japan's financial structure? and policies. In the economic and 
financial environment of the high growLh era the main bank system matured and 
flourished. If represented a successful solution fo a key developmental problem: 
how to finance large industrial enterprises efficiently and effectively. Directly 
and indirectly, notably in cooperation with the long term credit banks, Lhe main 
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brinks were fypiea I ly the single most important source of externa! finance, long 
term as well as short term, for most of Japan's large industrial onferpr isos. I he? 
specific merits of l;he main bank system as a model for olher countries is 
discussed in more detail 'later in l;his section. 
I ven broader lessons can also t)e deprived from l;he Japanese case of 
financial development, particularly \n the postwar high growth era. Moreover, Lhe 
main bank system cannot be evaluated \n isolation; after all, if is a subset of 
the banking system, which has constituted Lhe core of the Japanese financial 
system. The acknowledged ei feet i veness of Lhe Japanese financial system depended 
upon its institul; iona I structure (financial archiLecture). government (inane la I 
policy, and the macroeconomic policy environment, as already discussed. I his does 
not mean that anoLher country should aim Lo replicaLo the Japanese (inancial 
system in toto. It is necessary to identify the key issues and Lhe relevance of 
the Japanese experience or model \ \' you will for dealing with them. 
The "lessons for i inancial institution development and for appropriate 
policies are essentially structural and longer run. Pol ieymakers must have some 
long term (10 to ?.() year) vision of what the financial system should be. and an 
understanding of the process by which these long Lerm objectives can be achieved. 
As stressed at the beginning of this chapter, the most effective institutional 
arrangements and policies depend critically on each country's own goals, its own 
history, and its current situation, it is important to remember that even in the 
economically most advanced countries, as recent finance theory has stressed, 
markets are incomplete, information is imperfect and costly to obtain, and if is 
not possible Lo write compleLe contracts covering all contingencies; the 
conditions in developing market economies and TSI-.'s are much further removed from 
the neo-classical, perfectly competitive model. 
A skeptical view of the styli/od facts of the prototypical developing 
market economy is that if has a host of problems: macroeconomic instability; a 
limited institutional and physical infrastructure; low levels of economic, 
business, and financial information; quite imperfect markets with considerable 
market power and profound information asymmetries; weak banks and capital markets; 
and lack of human capiLal skills in finance and oLher areas. Prototypically, its 
government pursues low interest rate policies, restrictions on competition among 
financial institutions, and credit rationing; financial repression is moderate to 
severe?. Accountability sanctions and rewards for decisions is not high; 
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corruption. boLh personal and instilulionaI, is a problem oi' some? seriousness; and 
soft-budgeting practices, especial ly tor* large?, state control led or "strategic" 
enterprises. Lend to misaI locate resources and undermine macroeconomic stab i I i i;.y. 
I'hese difficulties are more? extreme in the prototypical transforming socialist 
economy; moreover, it has a much more limited historical hen" Lage of a markel; 
economy and its institutions, and a pro round lack of requisite human skills.. I.I; 
is from Lhis perspectives that transferal) i I i ty of the Japanese experience should be 
eonsidered. 
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h. 1 General I essons 
b.1.1 Macroeconomic Stabi lity 
the most important general lesson, and not j"usL rrom i,hc Japanese 
experience. is that macroeconomic: stability is essential to achieve rapid, 
sustained economic and financial development and. over Lime, a more? open and 
competitive economic system with strong financial institutions. Control over 
inflation is essential for Lhe development and effective functioning of the 
financial system. Mosl; savers mainly demand safe, liquid financial assets 
(deposits) whose real value is not eroded by inflation: only as fheir weaILh 
accumulates arc? Lhey willing Lo diversify info longer form and riskier assets. 
following the Occupation sLabi I i/aLion policy of 1949, Japan pursued a 
fiscal monetary policy mix of fiscal Lightness and rapid money supply growth 
commensurate with price stability. I he? government budget was balanced, government 
debt issue was negligible, and the ratio of government debt to GNP was very low. 
this macroeconomic policy mix supported Lhe modest role of the government \n 
domestic demand and the central role of private sector finance, particularly bank 
loans, in funding business growth. 
Sufficient political stability Lo reduce to reasonable levels uncertainties 
about the major contours of major economic and social policies and the likelihood 
of disruption of ordinary economic aeLiviLios is important in any country. Ihe 
Japanese experience was extraordinary in Lhe degree of poliLical sfabiliLy 
achieved in 1.95b by the alliance? of moderate parties to form Lhe Liberal 
Democratic Party, which was in power conLinuously until 1993. Perhaps equally 
imporLant in the high growth era was Lhe? widespread consensus that government 
policy should focus on economic growth, a consequence in part of Lhe dramatic loss 
of World War II. 
Lconomic policy on the whole promoted the development of a competitive 
environment, particularly in product markets. Initially producers were protected 
from imports; easy entry nonetheless resulted in quite competitive domestic 
markets, reinforced by the vr.ry si/e and rapid growth of the economy. There were 
less compel; itive sectors, and some became increasingly so as the economy grew: 
agriculture and wholesale and retail Lrade? most notably, labor markets were in 
principle \:rc.c, but the ever-growing demand of large firms for labor trained to 
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their specific needs made the development of a permanent employment system 
efficient. The land market and stock market were on the whole compel, i i, i ve. 
finance is most effective when (ensconced in a compel i L i ve economy; it can respond 
to the right price signals. At the same? time CI nance U s e If was Lhe slowest 
sector to develop competitive markets. However, as is argued below, at least 
initially the regulatory restrictions on competition were strongly supportive? of, 
and many would argue essential tor, the development of a strong banking system. 
One consequence was the development ot a producer-oriented society, but 
consumers and savers also benefited enormously, it indirectly. Japan's fast 
growth from the early 1%()s to the mid 19/0s generated rapid increases \n wages, 
household incomes, and consumption. Japan's standard of living, despite many 
problems, rose far more rapidly than it ever had before and more? rapidly than any 
other country in the world during that time period. Until well into the period, 
there was an implicit social contract whereby households accepted low yields on 
savings deposits and poor housing quality in exchange for a system that generated 
rapid growth in GNP and household incomes. 
{>.]..? The Structure of the financial System 
The Japanese experience, and indeed that of all market economies, is that 
banks play a predominant role in business finance?. Securities markets become a 
significant source? of large? enterprise finance? only in the 1980s. The policy 
issue was whether large enterprise finance?, particularly for plant and equipment 
investment, can be? done? effectively through a banking-based system. The Japanese 
main bank system, involving close? coordination between city banks and long term 
credit banks, has demonstrated that it can. Moreover, it suggests Japanese? 
policymakers were correct In having rejected U.S. Occupation proposals to develop 
a corporate bond market as a major source of corporate finance?. 
there are several strands in the analysis. I'irst. the demand for 
industrial 'long-term finance? was particularly strong. As consequences of both 
World War II destruction and their technology absorptive capabilities, firms in 
large scale, capita I intensive? ("heavy and chemical") industries were? \n a good 
position to develop profitable projects. Second, there was a term mismatch. 
Savers were not prepared to purchase corporate bonds since their assets were 
limited, they well remembered the all -too-recent disastrous effects of inflation 
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on bond portfolios, <.)ruJ they were risk averse, Wr.ini.irKj Lo hold safe, short term, 
'liquid financial assets, third, information about corporations was limited and it 
was difficult Lo assess risk. Institutions accounting, auditing, securities 
analysis, credit rating agencies i;o support monitoring Lhrough a corporate bond 
market were underdeveloped or non-existent. fourth, the human resource skills Lo 
evaluate the creditworthiness oi' 'large corporations and their projects to do 
monitoring were in very scarce supply. IL made sense Lo concentrate them aL a 
relatively small number of institutions, namely the longterm credit banks and Lhe 
city banks. fifth, the Occupation induced the 'legal separation of commercial and 
investment banking, because prewar banks had underwritten corporate bond issues. 
Lhey still had Lhe human capital skills, while the securities companies 
(invostmonf banks) did rrof, and personnel did not shift. I ven i I" the bond issue 
market had not been repressed, if is likely that the financial debenture of long 
term credit banks would have been preferred to corporate bonds, so that the flow 
of funds, at least in the early years, would not have been so different. 
formally Japan established a system of commercial banking, unlike? Germany's 
universal banking. Yet Japanese banking incorporated several of the attributes of 
universal banking: establishment of a close long term relationship with large 
industrial clients; arranging of long- term as well as short term finance: close 
monitoring of firms, from new project evaluation to ongoing performance to rescue 
restructuring in times of distress; and direct investment in the company's equity. 
there is no definitive answer whether the Japanese main bank model or the 
German universal bank model is more appropriate for developing market economies 
and iSl.s. My view is that the Japanese model has the edge. Underwriting 
securities issue is not a major practical issue where securities markets have not 
yet developed into a significant source of finance, ft has been argued that the 
German system involves co/ier, more self serving, oligopolistic relationships 
among a small number of banks and large firms. One aspect to which many attach 
considerable significance is the degree of bank ownership of a company's equity. 
Ownership certainly has symbolic value in Japan, with the main bank typically the 
largest bank shareholder of a firm, but power to directly exorcise control is much 
less clear since ownership was limited to \\)% (reduced to \)% effective \n 191)'/). 
The relevant lesson is that allowing banks to own noncentrolling shares in 
companies is desirable where it is an important element \n developing and 
maintaining the close bank corporation relationship. 
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The Japanese banking system embodied a system of specialized financial 
instituLions and segmented iinaricial markets. I'he former is probably appropriate 
for other economies; the latter is perhaps not. I he system discriminated in favor 
of large industrial enterprises; eiLy banks wore presumed Lo provide them short 
term and. inereas irig ly, long-term loans, while longtc?rm credit banks, trust 
banks, and insurance companies provided longer-term loans. Regional banks, mutual 
banks and credit associations financed medium and small enterprises. agricultural 
cooperatives financed farmers at substantially higher effective interest rates 
even adjusted for risk (which wore low because collateral requirements were high). 
The regulators and Lhe ethos of bankers perpetuated this dynamic disequilibrium \n 
segmented financial markoLs LhroughouL the high growiTi era. 
Market equilibrium analysis implies that small business enterprise 
investment was too low relative to large? firms. lhe counter argument is that 
large firms were key agents of growth as the importers and improvers of 
technology, and they diffused technology Lo smaller firms. My presumption is that 
most policymakers in developing markol economies and I SI s perceive large firms to 
be the engine of growth and their financing to be essential. Lvon if Lhis is 
true, they should be aware of the need not to distort financial flows too much 
away from smaller enterprises. Special attention needs Lo be given to creating 
and providing incentives for financial institutions that finance small business 
activities. 
Lhe three Japanese private long term credit banks, especially the 
Industrial Rank of Japan, played a crucial role in financing large? firm planl; and 
equipment investment, not only in providing funds buL especially \n project 
evaluation as to creditworthiness. They worked closely with Lhe city banks in 
syndicating term loans for main bank clients. Lhis was an effective? division of 
labor for some time until their respective? capabilities and business strategies 
increasingly converged, especially in the deregulation and easy money environment 
from the I9/Qs when private saving outstripped private investment. Lhe Japanese 
experience suggests that a system of commercial banks and of long-term credit 
banks working together is very effective. 
How about the respective roles of privately owned banks and other financial 
institutions and of government financial institutions? In many countries the? 
government owns the major banks and long term development finance? institutions. 
As a long run objective, that is a mistake in virtually all countries; it is 
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difficult to insulate government owned (or controlled) institutions from the 
political process, and their decision making processes arc? bureaucratic rather" 
than market oriented. 
The Japanese? financial slruclure demonstrates Lhaf an effoclive role can be 
found for government financial ins I; i LuL ions, where? their lending activities are 
focussed, limited, and complemonLary Lo pri vate financial i nsL it ui, ions . I wo 
factors w(?rc? key to their succ:(?ss: Lhey had to t)(? prof if making institutions, and 
they had autonomy from governmenf bureaucrats and politicians \n loan decisions, 
which they based on objective cr(?d iiLworf h inc?ss criteria of projected cash flow arid 
specific collateral. In l;his rc?spec:t Lhe Japanese? l(?sson is cautionary, lhaf the 
Japanese Development Dank is one of Lhe? ve?ry few cases of successful government 
development financial institutions was not an accident. 
An important reason for the? success of Japanese? government financial 
institutions is Lhaf Lhoy had access Lo cheap funds through Lhe? government's 
postal savings system, where deposit interest rates, as in private? financial 
institutions, were? subject to low ceilings. Postal savings, utilizing ubiquitous 
post office? branches, is a cheap, e:onvenienl; and c?ffective way for a government to 
mobilize private saving, there? are, however, elangers. One is that postal savings 
become an easy way for the government Lo finance? fiscal current expenditure rather 
channelling the funds to productive private busine?ss investment. Japan avoided 
this pitfall. Another danger is that postal savings deposits directly compete?. 
often on more? favorable? Lerms, with bank saving eleposits, Lhereby channeling 
savings away from private? financial sector intermediation. This has happened in 
Japan, in large part because the? Postal and telecommunications Ministry rather 
than the Ministry of finance has had authority ove?r postal savings. 
5.2 financial Public Policy Issues 
5.2.1 Deposit Safety, flank Safety, and Prudential Regulation 
Public confidence and trust in Lhe? banking system, and the financial system 
more broadly, are? essential for successful financial development. Particularly 
for household savers who offe?n are? ill informed about the actual conditions and 
trade offs among risk, yield, and liquidity of various financial assets deposit 
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safety is a high priority. Ihis Ccin be achieved Lhr-ouqh depos 1f insurance or1 by 
government guarantees that banks will noL be? d I I ovveni lo go bankrupt. 
The Japanese government pursued a very conservative policy of guaranteeing 
banks against formal failure. While the guarantee was implicit, depositors and 
indeed all financial market participants fully believed that the regulalory 
authorities would not allow a bank to fail, much loss let depositors fake any 
default losses. When a problem bank emerged, fhe regulai.ory authorities would 
intervene and, whore necessary, merge it into a stronger institution. Any bank 
was "too big to fail." In the Lurmoi I of the early postwar period, this guarantee 
was essential, and highly ePfeeUve; an additional guarantee of deposit insurance 
was of marginal significance. 
One dilemma of such strong bank safety guarantees is that they increase the 
moral hazard of banks faking excessive risks. lo prevent this, and to reduce fhe 
government's financial exposure, the regulatory authorities have a range of policy 
options, they can require high minimum capital -asset ratios, exercise strong 
prudential regulation and effective supervision, or ensure bank profitability 
through constraints on competition. 'Ihere is a danger that measures taken to 
restrict competition will result in rent-seeking behavior and credit 
mi sal location. 
Japan legislated but did not enforce high capital adequacy rules, and 
actual ratios were low. A basic problem was that equity capital was short and the 
only effective.} way to increase bank capital was through retained earnings. 
achieved by making banks profitable and restricting dividend pay out. Japanese 
policymakers did constrain the terms of bank competition by restricting entry. 
segmenting markets, and setting a ceiling rate on deposits sufficiently low to 
make deposit based lending very profitable (but sufficiently high, combined with 
favorable tax treatment, to prevent potential depositors from fleeing to real 
assets). 
Prudential regulation and effective supervision are essential in any 
banking system to prevent fraud, excessive risk faking or other forms of bank 
mismanagement, and to enforce rules designed to enhance bank safety. Japanese 
regulatory controls and supervision were very effective in the high growth era in 
ensuring bank safety and good performance, they were enforced both by valuable 
incentives (cheap central bank loans, new branch office licenses) and potentially 
severe sanctions (dividend payout reduction, replacement of management, merger). 
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in an environment in which bankers wore willing to play the rogu I afory game with 
the Ministry of I inance. The regulatory authorities know quite we'll the actual 
conditions of every cil;y, regional. trust and longterm credit bank (there were 
["ewer than 90 \n Lhe high growth era), worked quietly to solve any problems 
through guidance, and seldom disclosed problems so as not l;o undermine public 
confidence. 
The Japanese public trusted the power, authority, and honesty of Lhe 
Ministry of l-'inance and the regulatory framework and its administration. One cost 
was that it made possible a very non transparent system of regulation by 
administrative guidance and informal negotiations between Lhe banks and the 
Ministry of I;inance, \n what became co/y. non arms length relationships. In 
countries where Lhe public may be? more skeptical of government bureaucrats, and as 
a long -run objective even for Japan, a transparent regulatory system certainly is 
highly desirable, perhaps necessary. 
[).?..? low Interest Rate Policies and financial Repression 
Japanese experience provides two important lessons concerning financial 
repression, first, in comparison Lo many developing market economies and ISIs, 
the degree of Japanese financial repression was limited and modest. Ceiling 
interest rates were positive In real terms. Importantly, banks were able to 
adjust loan rates closer Lo market rates by requiring compensating balances, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of credit misa1 local; ion and rent-seeking behavior. 
Despite restrictions on entry there were a significant number of banks, especially 
in the large enterprise loan market, so that a reasonably competitive environment 
apparently emerged. Hanks were insulated from political and bureaucratic 
pressures in making specific loan decisions. In sum, Japanese policy and behavior 
apparently kept Lhe adverse effects of even the modest degree of financial 
repression to a minimum. 
Second, low interest rates, Lhe wide interest rate spread, and the 
restrictions on competition effectively subsidized the strengthening of what, \n 
the early 19b()s, was a fragile? Japanese? bank system. In this respect the rents 
from limited financial repression were used beneficially for institutional 
development. Many, though by no means all, experts on Japanese? banking and 
financial markets deem this support to have been essential for the building of a 
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strong banking system and, l).y extension. a strong rricj i ri bank system. It also has 
boon argued that Lhe (modesL) credit rents somo categories of borrowors obtained 
were constuctivoly indexed to objective, per formance •enhanc i rig indicators. 
It the present siLuaL ion in a developing markei economy is Lhaf Lhe degree 
of financial repression is moderate to severe? real interest rates are \ic.vy low 
or negative?, competition is limiLed. and credit rationing is substantial Lhen 
the lesson from Lhe Japanese experience is thai; 'less financial repression is 
better. lhe trade-off between Lhe benefits or insfiLutiona I dovelopmonL and the 
costs of credit misa I location and reriL-seeking behavior have Lo be weighed 
carefully, and the tendency Lo excessive financial repression resisted. Moreover, 
over time as Lhe banks become sLronger. Lhe need Lo subsidi/e insfiLutiona I 
support decreases and accordingly Lhe degree? of financial repression should be 
reduced, lo some extent this occurs Lhrough markeL forces as financial market 
participants find loopholes. In addition the government will find if desirable Lo 
pursue policies of financial deregulation and liberalization. One danger, as was 
the case in Japan, is that deregulation will be delayed because of bureaucratic 
inertia and desire to retain power, and the creation of vested interests \n the 
regulatod system. 
i).?.3 Directed Credit 
I Lake as a given that Lhe government's development strategy will place 
priority on certain activities, which will be subsidized in various ways including 
preferential allocation oi credit at lower interest rates. Lhe issues involve Lhe 
type of activity, the degree of subsidy, the nature of the credit allocation 
mechanism and process, and the potential inflationary consequences of the funding 
process. 
The Japanese government directed credit Lo promote exports, build physical 
infrastructure essential for industrial growth, and develop certain strategic or 
targeted industries, in comparison with similar programs in most developing 
market economies and IS! s, these Japanese? subsidies were relatively low. 
Moreover, the credit allocation process was objective and successful performance 
was a requisite for continued support. Lxport trade credit and loans for export 
production were not differentially subsidized by sector, wiLh the? exception of 
Lxport Import Hank term loans for sales of ships and machinery, infrastructure 
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investment' was financed directly through the government budge Is, Lhrough 
government financial inst ft uL ions. and Lo some extent by private financial 
insti Lutions (notably for the pr I VcjLc? electric power companies). Interest rates 
were below long term credit bank rales but wore positive, because government 
financial institutions wore nol; allowed l;o lose money and because i;hey re! ied on 
postal savings, which set a floor on Iheir lending rates. 
the role of industrial policy in the development process is more 
controversial. So too is detailed evaluation of /Japan's experience, the most 
significant facts of the Japanese experience are l;haf whiie some of the vi\nncr 
industries of Lhe high growth era obtained directed credit, olhors did nol;. and 
there were some? cases of failure? \n larger selection, lending by government 
financial institutions was lhe major form of subsidi/od, diroclod credit and was 
initially important bul became much less so from Lhe 1960s; government influence 
over private bank lending was indirect, relying on the financial structure and its 
incentives rather than on directly controlling credit allocation; and while 
industries were targeted, specific firms within them were subject to standard 
credit evaluation and project analysis. A major proportion of directed credit for 
plant and equipment investment in Lhe 19b()s went to four industries iron and 
steel, electric power, marine shipping and coal mining. Two of these shipping 
and coal became inefficient, declining industries from the 1960s, and absorbed 
a largo proportion of Japan Development bank loans because private banks .judged 
them unattractive. In the 1960s the proportion of targeted In total plant and 
equipment investment finance decreased substantially, and was not significant 
thereafter. 
The basic features of Japan's directed credit policy determined its 
success, and are directly relevant for other countries. They included: a 
relatively broad targeting concept (industries not firms); credit allocation done 
by bankers using objective? creditworthiness criteria; little interference by 
government officials or politicians; positive real interest rates, with relatively 
modest degrees of subsidy; implementation primarily through government financial 
institutions; reliance on private savings mobilized through the postal savings 
system; and utilization of the private institutional structure of long term credit 
banks, city banks (especially to their main bank clients), and trust banks for the 
provision of long term finance. A further, important lesson is that government 
financial institutions and their management must be held accountable?. In Japan 
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they were not allowed l;o be unprofi Lab lo, and had Lo be severe in requ ir inc.] 
collaleral and taking it in instances of loan default. I hey worked wil;h and were 
supplementary Lo private financial institutions, rather than being lit Lie more: 
fhan the agents of governmenl bureaucrats who determined specific allocations of 
"pol icy loans." 
\).?.\ Avoidance of Rent Seeking and Corruption 
Policymakers must eonfronl; the reality that in some economies corruption is 
a serious problem. In the financial sphere, opportunities for rent seeking and 
corruption are endemic when loan interest rates are set far below marker clearing 
rales, credit is rationed, and Lhe regulatory environment is weak. fhere are two 
levels of problem: individual and institutional. 
The finance literature quite appropriately emphasizes the importance of 
prudential supervision and of transparency l;o prevent individual banks, firms, or 
persons from engaging in excessive risk faking, favoritism, insider exploitation 
of asymmetric information, fraud, payment of bribes Lo obtain rationed crodil on 
favorable terms, and the like. Institutionalized corruption is more systemic in 
nature; it involves the financing of politics and Lhe political leadership through 
illegal contributions and payments in exchange for political and government 
official decisions to have credit allocated on preferential terms to favored 
firms. In effect credit rents are created by government policy, and used in part 
Lo support the government leadership. This is the central political economy issue 
of finance; it has not been subject to extensive empirical research for obvious 
reasons. 
The most effective way to deal with corruption is lo eliminate credit (and 
other regulatory) rents by promoting a high degree of market competition supported 
by an appropriate legal and institutional framework. This sharply reduces the 
opportunity for rent-seeking behavior. However achievement of a highly 
competitive market economy is an ideal, and certainly will not be achieved 
overnight. In finance, the degree of corruption is directly related to the degree 
of financial repression, which creates the regulatory credit rents. 
financial repression in Japan was modest and limited. Credit rents were 
relatively low, and specific credit allocation decisions wore insulated from 
significant political pressure or bureaucratic interference, and were made by 
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bankers by ob.jeeCi ve cri Lena of col lafora I arid cash flow. With the exception of 
government financial inst i CuC ions. effect i ve interesl; rates on loans were only 
modestly below market clearing rates. Legal, economic, and social sanctions 
against various forms of morally ha/ardous behavior were severe, prudential 
regulation was strong, and bank supervision was effective. Ihesc are the lessons 
Cor other nat ions . 
Thus, despite a few notable scandals, Lhe Japanese financial system by and 
large has not been subject to individual corruption. The degree of inst i l;ut iona I 
corruption hidden illegal donations to politicians and political parties by 
financial institutions has not been perceived by most Japanese Co have been an 
intolerable problem. However, this is a murky area, lhe nature of the 
relationships between Japanese banks, large and small, and politicians, national 
and local, is apparently close and particularly opaque, yet Co be subject Co 
substantive investigative reporting, it is worth noting that none of Che scandals 
of recent years regarding the transfer of regulatory rents by businesses Co 
politicians and bureaucrats (government procurement, trucking route licenses, 
terms of IPO issue) have involved banks. 
b.3 The Main bank System as a Model for financing large Industrial enterprises 
In any market-based financial system banks play a major role, certainly in 
the financing of small and medium firms and, except for the United States, in the 
financing of large industrial enterprises as well. lhe Japanese main bank system 
epitomizes in many respects the success of the Japanese banking system in 
mobilizing savings, and allocating them effectively through loans to business. 
particularly large enterprises. It is an especially appropriate model for bank 
financing of large enterprises in many developing market and transforming 
socialist economies. 
The essential features of the main bank model are micro. It is a low cos I;, 
efficient and effective institutional solution to Che problems of costly, 
imperfect, and asymmetric: information about borrower creditworthiness, given Che 
reality that markets are not perfectly competitive} and complete, and cannot be 
(Stiglitz, .1.99.1.). In a market based credit rationing model lenders classify, 
albeit imperfectly, borrowers into categories by degree of risk (creditworthiness) 
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\n order to overcome adverse selection and incentive prob I(MH.S (Stiglif/ and Weiss, 
198.1). The least risky eafegor les arc prer(?rred customers. I he most risky are 
simply not lent to. I he degree of rationing in informed i ate categories, depends on 
the supply of loanable funds, the quality of information for credit analysis, and 
to some degree on the effective interest rate it is possible to charge. 
In a regulatory model of credit rationing, government influence on the? 
effective interest rate has some? significance on the forms of bank loans; and its 
policies or signals indicating which activities or industries are of high or low 
priority influence bank thinking as to which categories firms should be assigned. 
A regulatory credit rationing framework enhances the power of the? bank vis a vis 
the borrower, by widening the gap between demand and supply, and makes the 
establishment of a main bank relationship even more? valuable to both bank and 
firm. 
As is stressed throughout this book, the essence of the main bank system is 
the ability of the bank to monitor effectively and to arrange for lundlng for 
those large industrial clients with which it has a particularly close and 
sustained main bank relationship, the city banks worked closely with the long 
term credit banks in new project evaluation and provision of long term funding 
through the main bank relationship, the main bank took responsibility both for 
gathering and producing information on the ongoing activities of its client and 
for providing the client information and advice (in effect, management consulting 
services) to enhance enterprise performance. It also took responsibility for, and 
a disproportionate share of the cost of, rescuing, restructuring, or liquidating a 
firm in distress, these monitoring functions are essential in any financial 
system, they constitute the core of what can, and in many cases should, be 
transferred to other countries as they develop their own banking systems. 
The most distinctive feature of the Japanese main bank system is it central 
role in the restructuring of large firms \n distress, at considerable? cost to the 
bank. This has proven to be a cheap and effective restructuring mechanism. 
Rescue is by no means automatic: the main bank makes a rational calculation as Lo 
whether the firm is worth more by liquidating its assets or by restructuring its 
activities and financial position and continuing it In operation. Liquidation is 
a complex and gradual process, ultimately involving merger into a stronger firm 
without going through formal bankruptcy. The bank requires a detailed financial 
and business plan, into which its own staff provide significant input; it has the 
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power to replace? management: and iL is able? to cleLermirie (through nogoi, i at ion with 
other creditors) the firm's new f inane i a I structure. Inev i'Lib ly there is 
considerable uncertainty in est imaf iing a firm's potential future? prospecLs; the 
presumption is that a close main bank relationship ensures the firm will be 
treated more generously than severely wilhin that range?, lhe great danger is that 
of soft budgeting, of providing new funds for the continued operation of firms 
that are not economically viable? and should be? 'liquidated. Japanese banks in the 
high growth era avoided the problems of soft budgeting, wii,h only a few mistakes. 
The lessons are that a commitment Lo rescue and restructuring should be 
conditional upon economic: feasibility, the restructuring should be? carefully 
planned and implemented, and Lhe? main bank should be tough in exercising its 
leadership both vis a vis the firm and ofher creditors. 
there were three? diroeL incentives for Japanese banks to seek out main bank 
relationships, the most important was the rent (or return) derived from investing 
in information about the borrower, and hence the reduction in risk premium for 
good borrowers, the need to recoup monitoring costs even in a relatively 
competitive? short term loan market was eased by the? system of delegated monitoring 
among banks. Second, the main bank received preference in providing various 
lucrative financial services to the? borrower, including transactions deposits, 
foreign exchange business, trustee and other fee business, and the business of 
subsidiaries and affiliate? companies. Ihese financial services markets were not 
completely competitive?; relatively high prices were? set by regulation or 
oligopolistic behavior, third, main bank ownership of corporate enterprise 
equity, even In the relatively limited amounts allowed, provided incentives to and 
benefits from monitoring (Kim, 1991). and signalled the closeness of the 
relationship, further, it can be? argued that the regulatory framework and the 
modest degree of financial repression effectively subsidized the institutional 
strengthening of banks in general, and made? them more willing and able to develop 
main bank relationships. Certainly the main bank system, which evolved in 
response to the economic and regulatory environment rather than as a consequence 
of direct government policies, well met the? interests of the government in 
promoting large enterprises as the engine of growth. 
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b.3.1 Issues \n Iransferring the Main l>ank System 
the? relevance, usefu Iness and transferal) i I i Ly or' the Japanese main [)ank 
model has l;o be placed in the? context of a t)roader range of issues of finance and 
banking development, and how they are resolved. Moreover, an effective main bank 
system cannot be created overnight. As with oLher types of institutional 
development, i I, Lakes time for learning, development of skills, creation of 
knowledge, and growth. 
One issue is the governance? of Lhe large banks that will be engaged in main 
bank relationships. Who owns the banks? Who controls bank policy, both of basic: 
business strategy and of specific: loan decisions? Concentrated ownership makes 
for shareholder control, the new privati/afion of Mexican banks places ownership 
and control in the hands of business groups. Will prudential regulation bo 
effective in preventing the owners from manipulating bank lending for their own 
benefit? In India commercial banks and development banks are owned by Lhe 
government; they are bureaucratic: and far from efficient. In China and Poland Lhe 
banking systems are government owned and nascent. In Korea bank equity ownership 
is dispersed, while control to a considerable degree has been vested in the 
government, which has had a dominant influence on bank policies, even at the level 
of certain specific enterprise and business group loan decisions. In Japan bank 
ownership is widely dispersed (except for a few small banks) and in normal 
circumstances management has great autonomy within the general parameters and 
guidelines set by the Ministry of finance. 
Management autonomy, a feature also of most large Japanese industrial 
enterprises, has worked well in Japanese banking, their incentives and sanctions. 
and insulation from politically motivated government pressures or self serving 
pressures of concentrated stockholders, have enabled them to allocate credit 
effectively. Yet if is by no means clear that management autonomy in bank 
governance will operate nearly as effectively in different institutional and 
policy environments, there? are dangers in a self serving management, 
expropriating rents for their own benefit. Perhaps the most significant lesson is 
that bank governance is an important matter since what is at stake is the 
efficient operation and effective? credit allocation of banks. 
Related both to corporate governance and the structure? of the financial 
system is the issue of where scarce human capital in banking ski lis should be? 
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concentrated initially, and how they should bo expanded rind diffused ovor time 
In early postwar1 Japan, project ova I ua Li on skills were initially concentrated by 
virtue of history \\\ the long-term credit banks, especially the Industrial Hank oi 
Japan. Over time city banks, particularly those with strong and extensive main 
bank relationships, developed project evaluation skills, City bank staff had some 
skill in monitoring the? ongoing operat ions of their client.s; over time. 
particularly through the requirements of Lhe main bank relationship, they built up 
those skills. those? with a substantial number and range of main bank 
relationships also developed skills in restructuring clients in distress, 
accumulating learning by doing and documenting, lhe lessons suggested by /Japanese? 
experience is that scarce? human skills might initially be? concentrated in a 
relatively small number of institutions, that skilled personnel should be trained 
up, and that over time they should be diffused among a sufficiently large? number 
of non governmenta I institutions so that information quasi--rents and oligopoly 
market power are reduced. 
the main bank system is effective in overcoming problems of project 
evaluation and lack of information about a client's creditworthiness. 
Nonetheless, where? the basic information is weak or where banking skills are 
lacking, asset based lending is a conservative complement to rather than 
substitute for cash flow and other techniques of performance analyses. During 
the asset price boom of the? late 1980s asset-based lending dominated cash flow 
analysis for many real estate projects; the expectation was that prices would only 
go up. which has proven to be an incorrect and costly assumption. 
the Japanese? banking system since? its modern beginning in the 19th century 
has had a history of requiring specific collateral for loans, particularly longer 
term loans, and of selling that collateral when loans were defaulted. Despite? 
potential inefficiencies in that entrepreneurs with excellent projects but 
inadequate collateral are rationed out of the? credit market, requiring collateral 
enhances bank safety and reduces borrower (and lender) moral hazard; \n many 
developing market economies and I SI s, these benefits probably outweigh the costs. 
An even more? conservative approach given high risks, especially \n ISIs, is 
initially to limit corporate finance to equity ownership, then non bank lending. 
and eventually limited fully collateralized, self-liquidating short term loans 
(McKinnon, 1991.). 
93 09 03 IIP Relevance 60 
The iricrin brink system is a particularly intensive and close form of 
relationship banking. The rolaf lOnsh ip in Japan is mult \(\ miens lona I and 
comprehensive, including equity ownership, is based on substantial trust by both 
sides, and involves careful bank monitoring. I he main bank leadership role in 
rescue and restructuring of a firm in distress is an important distinctive 
feature. As so defined, the main bank system applies in Japan only to the 
financing of large industrial corporations listed on the? stock exchanges. Smaller-
companies have a less intensive form of relationship bank inc.] which they also rc\:cr 
to as having a main bank, but the brink ex ante commitment to rescue and 
restructuring is limited \ \: it exists at all. Hut this does not mean that the 
financing of small business is unimportant. Quite the contrary. In the high 
growth era and even at present smaller, norr M s Led firms produce most 
manufacturing output and other industrial value added and are the predominant 
source of employment. One way or another, their growth has been financed. the 
lesson: policymakers must recogni/e the role of smaller enterprises, and ensure 
that the financial structure provides funds to carry if out. 
The main bank system can and does work well in a deregulated, competitive 
financial environment, as shown by the Japanese? experience since the mid 1970s. 
It was the major main banks that pressured the Ministry of finance to deregulate. 
Under changed domestic and international market conditions they saw new 
opportunities and believed (correcUy) in their superior abilities to compete. 
they had to adjust to the shifting of some major clients to securities market 
issue from bank loans, and the main bank relationship with some of them loosened 
and changed form. 
Does the main bank system represent an intermediate stage of large 
enterprise finance, in place only until economies grow and mature and securities 
markets become the more efficient mechanism? looking to Japan's future, in my 
judgment the development of a more competitive environment and the rise of an 
effective securities issue market will not result U) the demise of the main bank 
system, but will transform \i somewhat. A subset of very large?, successful, 
Japanese companies no longer need a deep, substantive relationship with a main 
bank; they are able and willing to finance internally or to ufili/e less expensive 
securities finance, they will become increasingly independent. Yet many large 
industrial companies will want to continue their well--established main bank 
relationship for its mutual shareholding and financial service features. Smaller 
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listed enterprises, without high credil. agency ratings, have? relied upon main bank 
guarantees for their bond issues; Lhe main bank continues i,o morn" Lor, but tor fees 
rather Lhan income? from loan:.). As Lhe 1990s progress, some banks may well end 
their main bank relationship wiLh cerLain smaller, weaker, less attractive listed 
enterprises, selling off their equity holdings m Lhe process. However, Lhoso are 
the companies for which main bank monitoring services ereaLe Lhe most value, so 
the main bank relationship is likely Lo be shifted from one bank Lo another. Only 
those companies where Lhe risks (and eosLs) of potential distress are high will be 
excluded from (rationed out of) the main bank sysLem altogether. they will Lhen 
be potential candidates in an emergen!. Lake-over market. On the other hand, banks 
are likely Lo seek out new main bank relationships, including equity holdings, 
with unlisLed, smaller companies wiLh good growth prospects that <)rc candidaLes 
Tor public listing (Packer. 1993)) Ihus. the main bank monitoring function will 
continue? to be important for all buL a relatively small proportion of large? 
companies. 
b.3.2 Special Problems of the Transforming Socialist Economies 
The transforming socialist economies can learn much from the Japanese 
historical, institutional, and policy experience of financial development and 
growth. As they succeed in making Lhe transition to market economies, Japan's 
high growth era will be particularly relevant. In their process of transiLion Lhe 
TSIs face many problems similar to those? Japan had in the early postwar period of 
dislocation and transition to democracy and a market economy. Japan had Lo deal 
with severe problems of shifting from armaments to civilian goods production, 
rampant inflation, very limited trade and stringent exchange controls,- a virtually 
insolvent banking system, and many insolvent large? enterprises due? to a horrendous 
bad (government--repudiated) debt overhang. Mow Japan solved these problems offers 
insights into good macroeconomic policies and to Lhe resolution of soft budgeting 
and debt overhang difficulties (see Teranishi, 1.993). There are major differences 
to keep in mind, however. Japan had a long experience as a private markoL economy 
and a quite well developed institutional infrastructure, only brieFly interrupted 
by wartime controls and economic planning. If had a reasonable? supply of human 
capital skilled in commercial and development banking. The early postwar Allied 
Occupation was an external force? which could impose pro-market, pro-democracy 
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changes in institutions, [)ol it: ics , and practices though to bo successful Lhc?.y 
ultimately had to bo acceptable to Japanese? policymakers and l;hc general public:, 
as in tact a I most a I I viorc. 
The important questions are: what can the ISPs learn i'rom Lhe architecture} 
and policies of the Japanese financial system and, congruent with the purposes of 
this study, from the main bank system? lhe answers depend on the particular 
problems policymakers face? in each ISI', as are well reflected in the chapters on 
China and Poland. there? is a burgeoning literature on Lhe appropriate financial 
architecture and policies for ISIs, much of if generated by the World Hank (see 
for example Caprio and Levi no. 199?, as well as McKinnori, 1991). It is beyond my 
purpose here to review and assess that literature, or to .judge what might be the 
best model of financial structure and policy for ISIs. 
We can say that the Japanese experience represents a very good model for 
the ISPs in several essential respects. It is a banking based system and at 
this stage of ISP development, banking is a more efficient mechanism for 
industrial finance for large enterprises than the securities market (Corbeff and 
Mayer, 199?). Active? stock markets apparently will develop relatively early in 
many ISIs as a result of the privatization process of large state enterprises. 
these are likely to be trading markets, useful for stockholder liquidity and for 
the function of price discovery. However, they will not be markets for 
substantial new fund raising through enterprise stock or bond issue; the 
uncertainties are too great, the? information too poor, the risks too high. 
hank monitoring, as based on the Japanese main bank mode?!, will more 
efficiently and effectively overcome information problems for lenders, and in the 
process instruct enterprises in the basics of cash ("low analysis, cost accounting, 
and other internal information-generating systems essential for creating viable 
firms. The creation of securities markets will facilitate? the effectiveness of a 
main bank system by more? readily providing the opportunity for bank ownership of 
enterprise? equity, thereby strengthening the incentives for deep monitoring and 
for commitment to take the leadership in rescue (or liquidation) of firms in 
distress. 
ISIs have two particularly important problems: the? overhang of state? 
enterprise accumulated bad debt, a problem compounded when the? debt is held by 
financial institutions rather than the government; and continued financing of 
economically non viable large enterprises (soft budgeting) for political, social 
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or other reasons. I ho banking system, or a m a m bank system, cannot solve these 
problems; they are essentially political in nature. Most of the costs of 
accumulated past bad debts will have to be absorbed by the government (society). 
It non viable enterprises are to continue to receive financial or other subsidies, 
it should be done? directly through the government budget rather than indirectly 
(and often in hidden ways) through financial institutions. If banks (or any 
financial institutions) are to be effective monitors and allocators of credit, 
they have to be prepared and able to deny funding to poorly performing 
enterprises, whether state or privately owned, ihis may well be the? greatest 
impediment to developing an effective banking system \n TSI's. A further dilemma 
is the lack of human skills; many financial officers In I SI s have experienced only 
soft budgeting, not hard. 
Mow much control over large industrial enterprises should banks have7 
there is no easy answer; the financial architects for each TSr will have to answer 
that based upon the particular country's circumstances. In the early stages there 
is probably some danger of too little control, of relatively limited relationships 
and monitoring. At the other extreme there is very much the danger of too great 
control, either by the banks themselves or, more likely, as instruments of the 
government (for example, Korea and India). In between the extremes are the 
Japanese main bank and German universal bank models. 
the choice between Japanese and German models of very close relationship 
banking will depend on a country's specifics of history, institutions, and values. 
What can be said is that the German and Japanese types of bank-based finance? are 
similar, and each has performed well in its own context. 
the main bank system is not a panacea, form without substance is usually a 
recipe for disaster. To be successful it must be buttressed by appropriate 
policies and behavior good prudential regulation and effective supervision, 
competitive financial as well as goods markets, and strong sanctions against poor 
performance. A wcry real problem is to devise a structure and policies that 
minimize opportunities for rent seeking and corruption. Kvon aside from 
information asymmetries, the transition process in TSI-s has been creating huge 
rents in the arbitrage between regulated and market prices, allocations by 
licensing and rationing (especially credit rationing), the privatization process 
of state enterprises and assets, and the I ike. 
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Given the reality of in forma Lion imperfections, costs, and asymmefr ics , 
institutional mechanisms for mon i Lor ing within and in .support oi; a generally 
competitive onvironmenL arc ossonf i a I . I ho Japanese structure of a do/on or' so 
nationwide oiLy banks and Lhroe long Lcrm credit banks as the? major financiers of 
large enterprises "led Lo workable competition despite some constraints and 
distorted incentives, lower* institutions would have resulLed in greater 
oligopolistic: behavior. A further1 lesson is the importance of the constraint that 
all. financial institutions government owned as well as private be 
profitable. 
6 Concluding Comments 
What has worked for Japan is what works everywhere: Lhrift, honesLy, hard 
work, education, property rights, a willingness to sacrifice for tomorrow, 
and strong families that Lake good care of children. (Rauch 199?, p. 110). 
there is no magic to Japan's economic and financial success. I he Japanese 
financial system and its main bank system have evolved over the past 40 years and 
more in response to economic: development and growth, occasional profound shocks, 
and the deepening of financial markets and financial intermediation. I he systems 
also reflect basic: government decisions about the appropriate financial structure 
and the financial policies to achieve broader developmental objectives and to 
support the financial system, lor the developing market economies and the 
transforming social 1st economies, Japanese experiences of early postwar and Lhe 
high growth era to the early 19/0s are particularly relevant and useful. 
lhe problems and difficulties the Japanese financial system and its banks 
face in the 1990s in the aftermath of the bursting of the speculative asset boom 
bubble of 1986 90 do not undermine the fundamental lessons of the Japanese case. 
What that experience demonstrates is that even strong systems and institutions, 
not only banks but their regulators, can fall prey to collective myopia, and that 
greed in periods of speculative mania can outweigh rational, conservative 
calculation of project viability, borrower creditworthiness, and collateral value. 
lor policy purposes in other countries, understanding of Japanese finance 
should be at three levels: how the Japanese system operated; within it, how the 
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banking system operated; and wilhin Lhat. how l;ho main bank system of close and 
special relat ionsh ips with large industrial enterprises operated. I ho lessons are 
both positive and cautionary. 
While the minimal package? of institutions and policies necessary for an 
effective transfer of the Japanese main bank system cannot be precisely specified, 
as a practical policy matter that may not be necessary. A great deal depends on 
the financial architecture and ('inane ia I policies being pursued in l;he 
transferring country. Very few are now pursuing policies whereby interest rates 
are market determined, entry is relaUvely easy, a bond issue marker is 
encouraged, and financial market compeli I; ion is vigorous. Although there is a 
debate in principle over Lho borici i Is and costs of Japanese policies of low 
interest rates, repression of the l)ond market, and rest rici; ions on compel if ion, 
•from the perspective of developing market economies and Lhe I Sis the important 
points are that the Japanese degree? of financial repression was modest, real 
interest rates and other incentives were positive, there was considerable 
competition, credit allocation was done? by objective, efficiency-based criteria 
without substantial outside inter Terence. and corruption was low. 
The most important lesson from this study is that Lhe Japanese main bank 
system is not only a relevant and useful model for large industrial enterprise 
finance, it may well be better for developing market economies and transforming 
socialist economies than other models. 
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